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The wireless sensor network (WSN) is an important platform that offers a variety of 
applications that can be used with significant interests in both academia and industry. It 
allows us to expand the usage of a large number of important applications in our life. It 
opens the door to develop applications such as object monitoring and tracking, traffic 
control, military applications, climate change and environmental surveillance, remote 
healthcare applications, infrastructure security, etc. However, the development of the 
sensor applications is complex due to the constraints and characteristics of the sensor 
networks. Therefore, there is a need for intermediate software layer to map the network 
applications with the sensor hardware, generally defined as a middleware. The 
Publish/Subscribe (pub/sub) interaction middleware has emerged as a suitable 
communication paradigm for large-scale distributed computing systems. That is because 
of the decoupling properties for the network’s participants in time, space, and 
synchronization. This model is well suited for many distributed systems especially those 
which are data-centric, where the applications are interested in the produced data rather 
than sender identity. Data Distribution Service (DDS) is a standard for supporting real-time 
distributed systems based on the publish/subscribe scheme. DDS includes many categories 
of Quality of Service (QoS) policies easy to use. Therefore, porting DDS features and 
xii 
 
functionalities into WSN may significantly enhance its development and performance. For 
WSN platforms, DDS has a light-weight middleware called TinyDDS. Developing 
applications in WSNs may require interacting with sensitive data. Therefore, it is important 
to protect the data. Securing the data can be either at the application level where the 
developers provide the security requirements, or at the middleware level, where the secuity 
requirements are implicitly supported and then, the developers can focus on the 
functionality of their applications. In this work, we plan to add security measures to the 
TinyDDS and thoroughly investigate the cost of adding the security measure on the WSN 
performance and constraints by means of simulation. We add a security service module to 
the TinyDDS. The module is transparent to the middleware, there are no modifications on 
the original application or the communication protocol. The results show a reasonable 
overhead in terms of performance metrics after adding security measures. Some variations 
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( منصة مهمة توفر مجموعة متنوعة من التطبيقات التي يمكن استخدامها مع اهتمامات WSNتعد شبكة المستشعرات الالسلكية )
فتح الباب تمهمة في كل من األوساط األكاديمية والصناعة. يسمح لنا بتوسيع استخدام عدد كبير من التطبيقات الهامة في حياتنا. 
حركة المرور ، والتطبيقات العسكرية ، وتغير المناخ والمراقبة أمام تطوير التطبيقات مثل مراقبة الكائنات وتتبعها ، ومراقبة 
البيئية ، وتطبيقات الرعاية الصحية عن بعد ، وأمن البنية التحتية ، الخ. ومع ذلك ، فإن تطوير تطبيقات أجهزة االستشعار معقد 
يين تطبيقات الشبكة مع أجهزة خصائص شبكات االستشعار. لذلك ، هناك حاجة لطبقة وسيطة للبرامج لتعفي بسبب القيود 
 pubاالستشعار ، والتي يتم تعريفها بشكل عام على أنها برامج وسيطة. ظهرت البرمجيات الوسيطة للتفاعل النشر / االشتراك )
sub / كنموذج اتصال مناسب ألنظمة الحوسبة الموزعة واسعة النطاق. ويرجع ذلك إلى خصائص فصل المشاركين في الشبكة )
ان والمكان والتزامن. هذا النموذج مناسب تماًما للعديد من األنظمة الموزعة وخاصة تلك التي تتمحور حول البيانات ، في الزم
( معياًرا لدعم األنظمة الموزعة DDSحيث تهتم التطبيقات بالبيانات المنتجة بدالً من هوية المرسل. تعتبر خدمة توزيع البيانات )
( سهلة QoSالعديد من فئات سياسات جودة الخدمة ) DDSى نظام النشر / االشتراك. يتضمن في الوقت الفعلي استنادًا إل
إلى تحسين كبير في تطويرها وأدائها. بالنسبة إلى األنظمة  WSNوالوظائف إلى  DDSاالستخدام. لذلك ، قد يؤدي ترقية ميزات 
 WSNs. قد يتطلب تطوير التطبيقات في TinyDDSعلى وسيط خفيف الوزن يسمى  DDS، تحتوي  WSNاألساسية لـ 
التفاعل مع البيانات الحساسة. لذلك ، من المهم حماية البيانات. يمكن أن يكون تأمين البيانات إما على مستوى التطبيق حيث يوفر 
مكن للمطورين المطورون متطلبات األمان ، أو على مستوى البرامج الوسيطة ، حيث يتم دعم متطلبات األمان ضمنيًا ومن ثم ، ي
والتحقيق بدقة في تكلفة إضافة  TinyDDSالتركيز على وظائف تطبيقاتهم. في هذا العمل ، نخطط إلضافة إجراءات أمان إلى 
. الوحدة النمطية شفافة TinyDDSوالقيود بواسطة المحاكاة. نقوم بإضافة وحدة خدمة أمان إلى  WSNمقياس األمان على أداء 
يالت على التطبيق األصلي أو بروتوكول االتصال. تظهر النتائج مقداًرا معقواًل من حيث مقاييس األداء للوسيطة ، ال توجد تعد






A traditional wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a group of multiple nodes that are 
usually inexpensive. In the typical single sink base-station WSN applications that is seen 
in Figure 1, data-flow moves from the sensor nodes to the monitoring application passing 
eventually by the sink node. By using a one-to-many communication scheme, sensors 
collect data and then send them to the sink node [1]. Therefore, sensors do not take any 
action on the collected data. Alternatively, in wireless sensor/actuator networks (WSAN), 
the concept of in-network decision making is developed. The network can take action on-
site without requiring external applications’ action [2] as seen in Figure 2. For the purpose 
of brevity, we will refer to both WSN and WSAN simply as WSN in the rest of our work. 
 












Figure 2: WSAN architecture with interaction types [3] 
 
The nodes of a WSN are usually distributed in undesirable or harsh environmental 
conditions. That makes them vulnerable to in place attacks, such as tampering and jamming 
attacks. Moreover, there are many applications where WSNs interact with sensitive data, 
and the sensor nodes may be located in a challenging environment, or are hardly reachable. 
Therefore, it is essential to handle the security issues of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (CIA) while designing the WSN applications. However, wireless sensors have 
constraints with respect to the computational power and energy sources. Therefore, 
utilizing the conventional security methods in WSN is hard to apply efficiently [4]. The 
threats in WSN directly correspond to the WSN application. Therefore, a WSN application 
can be secured either by implementing the security aspects in the WSN application or by 
securing the underlying WSN the application is running on top of. 
As far as the application of the security aspects for the purpose of securing the WSN 
application is concerned, the development of WSN applications is complex due to the 
constraints and the characteristics of the WSN. Hence, a middleware acts as an intermediate 
software layer between the WSN applications and the underlying WSN hardware. The 
middleware is used mainly to hide the complexity of underlying layers and to help the 
programmers to develop WSN applications easily. The publish/subscribe (pub/sub) 
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interaction middleware makes it an appropriate solution for real-time and large-scale 
distributed computing systems such as WSN [5-7]. Subsequently, it is desirable to modify 
the most suitable middleware for WSNs to account for security while considering the WSN 
limitations of the computational power and energy sources. 
  
1.1 Problem Statement 
As stated earlier, there are challenges with respect to securing WSNs due to their resource 
constraints. Therefore, it is infeasible to merely apply the security measures that are used 
for traditional networks directly. Many proposed security WSN schemes in the literature 
focus on achieving secure routing protocols, and/or secure data aggregation protocols. In 
this work, we consider selecting an appropriate pub/sub middleware such as TinyDDS [8] 
for WSNs for the purpose of enhancing it to account for the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (CIA) security requirements. Furthermore, we characterize the effect of these 
enhancements on the WSN performance and constraints. 
 
1.2 Research contribution 
This subsection lists the main contributions in our research. 
1. Summarize of the existing middlewares in the literature which account for 
information security in their implementation. The summary is based on the open 
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source availability, operating system, sensor devices platform, information security 
support, and the cryptographic algorithms applied. 
2. Summarize some of the main block cipher algorithms in the literature and their 
impact on the in WSNs. We considered the recommendations regarding the 
conventional and lightweight block cipher algorithms, and select suitable 
algorithms based on the energy consumption and memory occupancy. 
3.  Support information security for TinyDDS, by adding a security service module to 
the TinyDDS. The module is transparent to the middleware. 
4. The security enhancements in the middleware aim to provide data confidentiality, 
integrity, and message authentication. The simulation results for confidentiality 
algorithms are, AES, Present, and Prince. The algorithms used for integrity are, 
SHA1 and MMH. 
5. Regarding authentication, we implemented our devised protocol to ensure sensor 
nodes mutual authentication and session keys exchange. The protocol is inspired 
by the Kerberos protocol. We showed how the protocol is immune to some of the 
common attacks such as, Replay attack, Man-in-the middle attack, and 
Impersonation attack. 
 
1.3 DDS publish/subscribe basic model and components 
The interaction scheme of the publish/subscribe communication is well-fitted for large-
scale distributed systems due to its flexibility and scalability aspects. The two main entities 
in the architecture of this system are the Publisher and the Subscriber. The subscription 
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process generally takes place when a subscriber node expresses its interest in an event and 
request to be notified accordingly. This interest is registered or subscribed to with 
publisher, and when such an event exists, the publisher notifies the subscriber. The core of 
the publish/subscribe scheme is the notification service which acts as a mediator between 
the publishers and the subscribers. It gives the flexibility and scalability aspects of this 
communication model through the decoupling properties in space, time and 
synchronization [9]. In space decoupling, the publishers and the subscribers indirectly 
interact with the events through the notification service; they do not need to know each 
other or the location of each other. In time decoupling, it is not necessary that both the 
publisher and the subscriber are active at the same time. For instance, a subscriber can 
express its interest in an event, that is not published yet, and a publisher can publish an 
event without being subscribed by any subscriber yet. Lastly, in synchronization 
decoupling, the publisher and the subscribers are not blocked during their publishing or 
subscribing to events.  
Figure 3 depicts the standard DDS architecture. The root instance in the middleware is the 
DomainParticipant, which is a class initiated once. It maintains a list of all other instances 
in the middleware. In the application at the top of the middleware, an instance of Publisher 
class is initiated from the DomainParticipant. A Topic class has a value that represents an 
identifier of the content of an event. The application can declare as many instances of topics 
as the Publisher is interested in. On the Subscriber side, an instance of Subscriber class is 
initiated at the lowest level to monitor and capture the corresponding topic from the 
network traffic. The topic becomes associated with class SubscriberListener and class 
DataReader whenever there is a match on the content of the topic. Then, the instance 
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SubscriberListener informs the application about the matched event, where the data can be 
read from the instance DataReader. On the Publisher side, the application declares 
instances of class DataWriter, which is responsible for publishing the events associated 
with every topic declared. The application specifies the events to publish, through the use 
of DataWriter. The class Publisher is responsible for publishing the DataWriter instances 
to the lower-level in the network. 
 








2 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing approaches and methods in the literature regarding 
middleware and the security measurements for wireless sensors network. The literature 
review is divided into three subsections. The first subsection reviews the previous and the 
current classifications and approaches of WSN middlewares found in the literature. 
Whereas the second subsection focuses on the publish/subscribe communication approach 
for middlewares. It explores the importance and the benefits of this approach in developing 
WSN applications. The third subsection provides a description of WSN middlewares found 
in the literature that support secure communication specifically through cryptography. 
 
2.1 Middleware Classifications and Approaches  
 
The main purpose of a middleware is to hide the complexity of the layers of the underlying 
hardware and to conceal the heterogeneity that can exist in a network as seen in Figure 4. 
The authors in [10] provide a comprehensive survey of WSN middleware proposals and 
approaches. They built a reference model to classify and compare several WSN 
middlewares. In addition, they listed many ways on how the middleware can help 
programmers in applications’ development. Such as, providing the necessary system 
abstractions, so that the developer focuses on the functionality of the application without 
worrying about the details of the lower level communication implementations. Also, the 
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developer can benefit from the reusable code and data services, such as data filtering, so 
that they can be applied easily into the applications. Another middleware classification is 
based on the several factors to consider in designing a middleware for WSNs including 
operating system support, routing protocols defined, and sensor nodes’ specifications [11-
13] 
Moreover, several research papers describe the different middlewares that are designed for 
WSNs. For example, the study in [12] explores the approaches used in middlewares 
specific for WSNs. Also, the study presents the challenges in designing WSN middleware, 
such as support for heterogeneity, mobility, and scalability. Likewise, the authors in [13] 
present an extensive survey on service-oriented middleware for WSNs. The goal of the 
service-oriented middleware is to provide standardized models and protocols for the WSNs 
regardless of the implementation of the underlying infrastructure. As a result, services 
become easily available and accessible to the WSNs. 
 




A comparative study of different WSN middleware approaches is presented in [14]. The 
main classifications used are the following: 
• Database: The WSN is represented in the middleware as a virtual database. 
The advantage of such approach for the middleware is the simplicity of 
implementation. Accordingly, the WSN application commands simply 
become database queries and results in easier communications. However, such 
an approach suffers when supporting real-time applications. 
• Event-based: The middleware uses publish/subscribe communication 
scheme to simplify exchanging messages between the source and destination 
nodes. The main feature of this approach is supporting asynchronous 
communications that facilitate a loose coupling between the nodes in the 
network. 
• Application driven: The applications in the middleware are in control of the 
network management through supporting quality of service (QoS) parameters. 
The problem with this approach is the lack of heterogeneity in platforms 
support. 
•  Modular programming: The application in this approach is divided into 
smaller modules that can be separately updated. It reflects positively on the 
energy consumption. However, the approach does not support heterogeneous 
platforms. 
• Virtual machine: The middleware runs as a virtual machine on the WSN 
nodes. The advantage of this approach is the ability to develop independent 
small size modules of the WSN application that can be executed on 
heterogeneous platforms using interpreters. 
• Tuple space: This middleware approach applies the shared memory paradigm 
that is used in distributed computing systems to the WSN nodes. 




Table 1: Middleware approaches 
Middleware Approach Example  
Database SINA[15], Cougar [16], DsWare [17], TinyDB [18]  
Event Based Message Oriented Mires [19], TinyCubus [20], Runes [21] 
Application Driven MiLAN [19], AutoSec [22] 
Modular Impala [23] 
Virtual Machine Mate [24], Magnet [25], Agilla [26] 
Tuple Space Teeny Lime [27], Tiny Lime [28], TS-Mid [29]  
 
 
2.2 Publish/Subscribe Middlewares 
A pub/sub middleware is considered an event-based middleware as explained earlier 
subsection 2.1. The data-centricity and decoupling properties of the pub/sub interaction 
scheme make it an appropriate solution for real-time and large-scale distributed computing 
systems [5]. It provides efficient usage of WSN limited resources and matches well with 
their nature. The survey paper [3] studied and classified several pub/sub WSN middlewares 
based on the type of message exchange and their interaction model. The interaction models 
are channel-based, topic-based, content-based, and type-based, and are further explained 
in [3]. 
The pub/sub interaction scheme has several advantages over other communication models. 
For example, it is more efficient than client-server in latency and bandwidth utilization. 
The pub/sub model reduces the overhead required because it does not need a request for 
each new data generated. This reduction of outgoing request messages improves the 
pub/sub latency and saves network resources. Furthermore, it is capable of supporting one-
to-many connectivity with redundant publishers and subscribers. Therefore, it makes 
suitable for reconfigurable dynamic applications, such as in WSNs, in a robust manner. 
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More importantly, it maps well to connectionless protocols. For instance, it can take 
advantage of multicast technology to efficiently send data to multiple users [30, 31]. 
TinyDDS [8] is an example of the event based pub/sub middleware approach. It is 
compliant with the standard specifications of Object Management Group (OMG)’s Data 
Distribution Service (DDS) for WSNs. It is a lightweight version of the pub/sub DDS 
standard that offers flexibility and interoperability to the application in WSNs regardless 
of the programming language used in the application, and protocols supported in WSNs. 
Moreover, TinyDDS allows the developers to be able to have over fine-grain control on 
the WSN applications at the application-level and middleware-level. It provides flexibility 
in customizing and decoupling of non-functional properties such as event filtering, data 
aggregation, data storage, caching policies and routing through a pluggable framework. 
The non-functional properties at the application and middleware level are forming a library, 
called the TinyDDS library. Providing non-functional properties such as data aggregation 
and event detection that are frequently used in WSN applications, results in accelerating 
the application development. Hence, the developers can focus on the functionality more 
such as interpreting the process data and event. The maintainability will be improved due 
to the utilization of the non-functional properties that reduce the complexity of the 
applications. For the middleware-level non-functional properties, developers can change 
the behavior of the middleware to meet the constraints desired, such as adjusting the QoS 
of the middleware’s component or changing the routing protocol. The library of TinyDDS 
is portable which can be used by multiple TinyDDS applications. Utilizing the non-
functional properties will result in more reusable, maintainable and better performance in 
developed applications. The features of TinyDDS middleware and the advantages of the 
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pub/sub interaction scheme make TinyDDS the most suitable WSN middleware to add the 
security measures to. By adding security to the non-functional properties will lead in 
developing applications that are secure. 
There are several pub/sub middlewares for WSNs other than TinyDDS. For example,  
Mires [19] TinyCubus [20], and Runes [21] are similar to TinyDDS in that they implement 
pub/sub communication on TinyOS [32] and allow flexibility in customizing and 
decoupling application-level non-functional properties. However, unlike TinyDDS, they 
do not consider the middleware-level non-functional properties and interoperability across 
the boundary of WSNs and access networks. On the other hand, regarding the support of 
QoS, and nodes mobility. The Mires middleware does not support QoS such as, Deadline, 
Priority, and Reliability. Also, it does not support node mobility. The TinyCubus 
middleware support Reliability and node mobility. Whereas, the Runes middleware support 
only Reliability QoS through external components. Also, it supports nodes mobility. The 
TinyDDS middleware supports Deadline, Priority, and Reliability, but does not support 
the nodes mobility. 
SMC [33] is another pub/sub middleware specific for body-area sensor networks. It is 
assumed that it will operate on a Java VM atop a powerful Linux node. Hence, SMC does 
not account for memory footprint and power. Whereas, TinyDDS assumes resource-limited 
nodes as its target platform. In addition, SMC does not provide flexibility in middleware-
level non-functional properties, and interoperability in programming language and protocol 
as TinyDDS does. DsWare [17] is yet another pub/sub middleware that provides flexibility 
only at middleware-level non-functional properties but not at the application-level nor 
providing interoperability in programming language and protocol as TinyDDS does. 
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2.3 Middlewares with Security Support 
Several middleware platforms support security in their services through cryptography. SM-
Sens [34] is a middleware that provides security on data through message authentication 
and using symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Also, it takes advantage of the 
hierarchical routing to distribute cryptographic keys. Moreover, it uses intrusion detection 
to exclude compromised nodes in the network. However, it does not support programming 
language interoperability across platforms. STaR [35] is a transparent configurable 
component middleware for securing communication in WSNs in which the confidentiality, 
integrity, and authentication are provided through encryption. It is considered a transparent 
middleware because there is no need to change the communication protocol and the 
application itself. It supports multiple security policies at the same time, called traffic flow 
policy. The STaR middleware can be classified among the Modular middlewares category 
discussed in subsection 2.1. It offers the ability to exclude some of its modules in order to 
save memory. SpartanRPC middleware [36] provides a link-layer remote procedure call 
(RPC) scheme by extending nesC [37] programming language, which is protected by 
language-level policy specification. Moreover, it incorporates the security architecture in 
a heterogeneous environment. Also, the information security supported in the middleware 
account for data confidentiality using the AES algorithm. SMEPP Light middleware [38] 
is based on a subscribe/event mechanism which provides group management, group-level 
security policies, methods for query injection and data collection. It is similar to TinyDDS 
in that it implements pub/sub communication on TinyOS. However, it is not an open source 
middleware. The authors in [39] accounts for the availability security requirement through 
intrusion detection systems in addition to cryptography methods for protecting data. Other 
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middleware platforms provide security using defense strategies against specific attacks. 
For instance, Di-Sec [40] provides a defense framework through training phase that makes 
the nodes able to the behavior to adapt to attacks. The variety of security policy in the 
middleware allows to setup multiple security policies at the same time, and it can be 
changed at the runtime for the packets. 
In [41], the authors propose Component and Policy Infrastructure (CaPI)  middleware that 
includes security. The tool is mostly focused on the opportunity to include security during 
application development. It offers two first-class programming abstractions, components, 
and policies. Components implement coarse-grained and reusable units of software 
functionality that are used to realize functional application concerns. Resource constraints 
dictate that these components must allow full access to low-level features provided by 
heterogeneous OS and hardware platforms. In contrast, policies are a more lightweight 
abstraction, implemented in an efficient, expressive, platform-independent language that is 
designed to support customization and management of behavioral concerns at runtime.  
ESCAPE [42] is a policy-based WSN middleware implemented on TinyOS. Applications 
in ESCAPE are implemented using nesC-components and adopt a similar pub/sub 
interaction model as in CaPI. However, ESCAPE differs from CaPI in a significant number 
of elements. First, the set of components and policies on a node in ESCAPE is not 
dynamically adaptable. Policies and application components cannot be dynamically 
installed, removed, nor recomposed. At compile time, ESCAPE policies are statically 
integrated together with the application code. As a result, policies can only be activated 
and deactivated at runtime. Second, ESCAPE policies are used to specify all application 
behavior, including the definition of distributed interactions. For instance, policies are used 
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to schedule timers to sample data, handle time-outs, filter resulting measurements, and 
publish events over the network. 
In [43] a security architecture that integrates, enriches, and extends a component-based 
middleware layer with abstractions and mechanisms for secure reconfiguration and secure 
communication. The security policies are processed by a module external to the 
middleware. 
 Table 2 provides a summary of the existing middlewares in the literature which account 
for information security in their implementation. The summary includes the open source 
availability, operating system, sensor devices platform, information security support, and 
the secure algorithms used.  
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3 CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND PROPOSED APPROACH 
In this chapter, the methodology and the tentative plan of our work is presented along with 
the phases and their tasks for our work progress. Discussion on the existing cryptographic 
algorithms and compare their performance on different sensor platforms to decide which 
algorithm to select for our implementation of the security service module. To estimate the 
effect of implementing our security service, in the next section, we define the performance 
metrics used in the evaluation of our implementation for modified TinyDDS and lastly, we 
present the simulation tools used to run the experiments. 
 
3.1 Methodology 
PHASE 1: (objective 1) 
In this phase, we will conduct an extensive literature review and survey. It is divided into 
three tasks as follows: 
Task 1: Survey the previous work in security targeting the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability requirements in WSNs. The purpose is to identify obstacles, major 
needs, types of attacks and current defenses in WSNs. 
Take 2: Review the current pub/sub interaction schemes for WSNs to point out the 
schemes’ main concepts, components, architectures, and variants. 
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Task 3: Survey the previous work related to secure middleware for WSNs, and 
summarize the findings in a comparison study. 
Approach: Exhaustive search will be undertaken to find the state-of-the-art of the 
relevant high-quality research. 
PHASE 2: (objective 2) 
The modified-TinyDDS middleware for WSNs will be proposed in this phase.  
Task 1: Modified-TinyDDS development: We are going to modify the TinyDDS 
to add security components for the purpose of achieving information security. We 
are mainly targeting the confidentiality and integrity security requirements of the 
data through means of encryption/decryption methods. In addition, we consider the 
aspect of availability as a security requirement for WSNs. In achieving these 
security requirements, we take into consideration the resource constraints in 
wireless sensor nodes, especially the memory size and power consumption.  
Approach: Identify improvements related to WSN security requirements to be added to 
TinyDDS guided by the intensive survey from the previous phase. 
PHASE 3: (objective 3) 
The impact of the security modifications added to the TinyDDS on the WSN performance, 
and QoS support will be thoroughly investigated in this phase. 
Task 1: Preparing the simulation environment, and building the testing scenarios 
for the modified-TinyDDS. 
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Approach: TOSSIM simulator [57] will be used to simulate the modified-TinyDDS 
(pub/sub technique). 
Task 2: Evaluate the performance of the modified-TinyDDS, and collect and 
analyze the results. 
Approach: A performance evaluation comparative study will be conducted between 
the modified-TinyDDS and the basic TinyDDS. The performance metrics 
pertaining to memory footprint, energy consumption, and communication overhead 
will be considered. The tradeoffs between security components added will be 
investigated through the analysis of the simulation results. 
PHASE 4: (objective 4) 
This phase aims to show our proposed solution performance by adapting it to work in a 
practical application. 
Task 1: Studying the practical application requirements. 
Task 2: Practical application development and evaluation. 





3.2 Data security using cryptographic algorithms 
Recently investigators have examined the effect of security algorithms on the energy 
consumption for WSNs. A number of [58-61] studies have found that using asymmetric-
key algorithms consume more energy than symmetric-key algorithms in WSNs. Despite 
using methods like elliptic curve cryptography or dedicated cryptography coprocessors, 
which are considered as energy efficient methods, but the energy consumption overhead 
cost is still high.  
In this work, we are interested in studying and applying block cipher symmetric-key 
algorithms to the TinyDDS middleware and reporting the overall performance evaluation 
in the network. We are considering the recommendations from previous studies while 
selecting suitable cryptographic algorithms.  
Jinwala et al. [62] argue that using the block cipher XXTEA may be regarded as the optimal 
choice for data confidentiality in WSNs alongside applying the offset codebook (OCB) 
mode for authentication functionality. They have studied three algorithms, namely, 
Skipjack, AES, and XXTEA. They compared their performance on the Mica2 wireless 
sensor node platform using Avrora simulator. Likewise, Law et al. [63], studied the effect 
of block cipher algorithms in WSNs. They reported the influence of Microcontroller Unit 
(MCU) cycles and memory occupancy, but they did not report the energy consumption. 
Their study included several blocker cipher algorithms, such as Skipjack, RC5, RC6, 
MISTY1, Rijndael, Twofish, KASUMI, and Camellia. They recommend using Rijndael 
for security priority and MISTY1 for memory storage, and both are energy efficient among 
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the others. However, they did not provide details of the platform used to conduct their 
experiments.  
Lee et al. [64] provide details regarding performance evaluation of block cipher algorithms 
and operation modes. They have analyzed four algorithms, AES, RC5, Skipjack, and 
XXTEA. Then, they have reported the influence of the key size for these algorithms on the 
energy consumption. They point out that their results are more realistic due to the use of 
actual sensor platforms. That is, by using Tektronix MSO 4034 oscilloscope, they are able 
to measure the drop in voltage, and then, find the energy consumption of the algorithms 
while considering their execution time. Their findings have been observed from conducting 
their experiments on two widely used platforms, MicaZ and TelosB; the same wireless 
sensor motes we are considering. Their results show that Skipjack and XXTEA are better 
in performance as they require fewer memory and consume less energy than the other 
algorithms. On the other hand, RC5 and AES provide more security than the others. The 
key size of RC5 and AES has a direct impact on energy consumed, as more execution 
rounds are needed for longer key sizes. Similarly, Trad et al. [65] investigate AES, RC5, 
and RC6, but they use Mica2 platform. Their results show that RC5 is the best cipher 
algorithm with repect to excecution time and the energy consumed. 
A performance evaluation comparison study for WSN [66] that includes AES, RC6 and 
Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA), shows that AES is the best choice regarding the 
execution time, SEA requires the least memory storage, and RC6 performs the best 
regarding the bandwidth usage. Another performance comparison study for block cipher 
algorithms is analyzed by Biswas et al. [67]. The study covers Skipjack, XXTEA, RC5, 
AES, and CGEA and implements them on two platforms, Mica2 and Arduino Pro motes. 
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The results show that RC5 requires the least amount of memory storage, whereas Skipjack 
requires the most. However, Skipjack consumes the least energy in comparison with the 
other algorithms. AES and XXTEA consume less energy than RC5. On the other hand, 
AES with size key 128 is more secure than XXTEA, RC5, and Skipjack.  
More recent attention has focused on proposing and developing lightweight block cipher 
algorithms for WSNs. For example, HIGHT [68], Simple Lightweight Encryption Scheme 
[69] and Lightweight Security Protocol [70] provide a good level of security, and they are 
considered energy efficient algorithms when examined on Mica2 platform. However, 
experimental results indicate that many of the lightweight algorithms have poor 
performance compared to conventional block ciphers [71, 72]. 
Relying only on encryption for data confidentiality without ensuring data integrity and 
authentication has been proven to be insecure [73]. There are different ways to implement 
message authentication code (MAC) to support data integrity. It can be constructed directly 
from block cipher algorithms using different approaches resulting in MAC variations such 
as OMAC, PMAC, CBC-MAC, XMAC, and CMAC. CBC-MAC is found to be insecure 
for long messages. The insecurity problem is resolved by using XMAC which operates on 
variable-length messages. CMAC is recommended by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), which also resolves the problems of CBC-MAC. Unlike XMAC, 
CMAC can operate with only one key [64]. Alternatively, HMAC is a technique using to 
construct a MAC without the need for cipher algorithms. The implementation of HMAC 
is based on cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 and SHA1 [51].  NIST considers 
HMAC-SHA1 [74] as a standard for generating HMAC. HMAC can be used to ensure data 
integrity and authentication at the same time.  There are other implementations of MAC 
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algorithms based on universal hash functions which are considered very fast such as, 
UMAC [75] and VMAC [76].  
Our implementation to support integrity and authentication considers the use SHA1 to 
construct HMAC. Alternatively, we used MMH [77] to construct the MAC based on the 
idea of universal hash functions. The reason for using MMH is that the MMH memory 
requirement is small as compared to SHA1. Moreover, the MAC size obtained from 
HMAC-SHA1 is 20 bytes, whereas, using MMH, the size of the MAC is only 4 bytes. A 
third approach that is considered to support integrity and authentication is based on MAC 
truncation. The MAC truncation method is used in WSNs to improve performance without 
the risk of losing security due to collisions [73]. Thus, it can be applied to produce 4 bytes 
MAC from 20 bytes HMAC-SHA1. In comparison, the size of the input block for SHA1 
is 64 bytes, whereas MMH operates with variable block size. Hence, we consider 
implementing both options for HMAC; 20 bytes and truncated 4 bytes. 
3.3 Performance Metrics 
In this section, we present the performance parameters used to investigate the effect of 
adding security components for the middleware. Different scenarios for the network traffic 
will be constructed to evaluate the system behavior with respect to the memory footprint, 
energy consumption, and communication overhead performance metrics.  
3.3.1 Memory Occupancy 
This metric is evaluated by compiling the code of the middleware and the application on 
top of the operating system TinyOS. The memory occupancy shows how much is required 
before installing the code into the wireless sensor mote’s memory. The memory details of 
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ROM and RAM will be provided after the compilation of the code is successfully done. In 
our test, we will find the memory occupancy for four motes, MicaZ, Mica2 TelosB, and 
IRIS. Table 3 provides the on-board memory distribution of different motes.  
Table 3: Memory size detail for different motes  
Mote RAM (kB) ROM (kB) EEPROM (kB) 
MicaZ 4 128 512 
Mica2 4 128 512 
TelosB 10 48 1024 (external) 
IRIS 8 128 4 
3.3.2 Energy Consumption 
Sensor nodes usually work on batteries which are considered a limited source of power. 
Hence, energy consumption metric is critical in WSNs. Therefore, it is necessary to 
maximize the lifetime of the sensors by trying to keep the communication and computation 
activities working with minimum power requirement. Online Energy Model (OEM) [78] 
is a tool based on POWERTOSSIMZ [79] extension, which is integrated into TOSSIM 
[57] simulator to support energy measurements for TinyOS applications. The energy 
consumption metric is calculated by using OEM for computing the total energy 
consumption for the entire network nodes. There are two main components contribute to 
the energy consumption, Radio and Microcontroller (MCU). Each component’s value is 
calculated separately by taking the summation of energy consumption of all nodes in the 
network in the milli-Joule unit.  
3.3.3 End-to-End Delay (EDD) 
Latency or End-to-End Delay is evaluated by taking the average delay of the successfully 
received packets in the network. Although it depends on the underlying protocols in the 
middleware, in our comparison these protocols are fixed for all versions of the middleware 
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modifications. TOSSIM [57] simulator is used to track the packets from the moment they 
are sent from the Publisher’s node side until they are successfully received at the 
Subscriber’s node side. Each packet delay includes the packet processing, buffering and 
communication time. 
3.3.4 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
Packet Delivery Ratio is the percentage obtained by dividing the total number of 
successfully received packets at the Subscriber’s node side by the total number of sent 
packets at the Publisher’s node side.  This metric gives an indication of the network 
behavior regarding the packet loss. Similar to EED metric, the PDR metric depends on the 
underlying protocols. The reliability QoS of the middleware is set to best effort option for 
all versions of the middleware modifications so as to compare between all these 
middleware versions. Note that if the QoS is set to be reliable in the middleware, the value 
of PDR is always one. 
 
3.4 Simulation Tool 
The main simulation tool used in our performance evaluation is TOSSIM [67], an event-
driven simulator. According to [67] it is the most accurate simulator to simulate the 
behavior of WSN implemented on top of the TinyOS. It is written using network embedded 
systems C (nesC) [37] language, a dialect of C language. The energy performance metric 
is estimated using a plugin tool OEM [78] which is based on POWERTOSSIMZ [79] 
extension, integrated into TOSSIM. Currently, the current implementation of TOSSIM 
simulator only support simulating the behavior of only the MicaZ sensor nodes. Therefore, 
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our results for most of the performance metrics are available for only the Micaz sensor 
node. However, The OEM tool allows estimation of the energy for other sensor platforms, 
such as TelosB. Tables 4 and 5 provide the readings of the current consumption of Radio 
and Microcontroller (MCU) for the main components modes responsible for the energy 
consumption from the datasheet of both the MicaZ and TelosB sensor platforms. The OEM 
tool, estimate the energy consumption by substituting the value of the current for the 
corresponding mode. There are four modes or states for the Radio, Receive, Transmit, Idle, 
and Sleep. For the MCU, there are three modes, Active, Idle, and Sleep. The mode changes 
during the simulation. Accordingly, the value of the current changes, which impact on the 
total estimated energy. The energy consumption value depends on the value of the voltage 
value, the corresponding mode’s current value, and the duration of time the sensor mode 
holds. 
Table 4: Radio current consumption of MicaZ and TelosB 
MicaZ TelosB 
Mode Current Mode Current 
Receive 19.7 mA Receive 23 mA 
Transmit 17.4 mA Transmit 17.4 mA 
Idle 20 uA Idle 21 uA 
Sleep 1 uA Sleep 1 uA 
 
Table 5: MCU current consumption of MicaZ and TelosB 
MicaZ (ATmega128) TelosB(MSP430) 
Mode Current Mode Current 
Active 8 mA Active 1.8 mA 
Idle 4 mA Idle 54.5 uA 
Sleep 9 uA Sleep 5.1 uA 
 
The default current readings in the OEM tools are for MicaZ platform. The current readings 
values of TelosB are applied in the OEM, replacing the values of MicaZ. Accordingly, we 
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can retrieve the estimated values of the energy consumption for Radio and MCU for TelosB 
sensor platform. 
The OEM tool consists of several components. The values in the tables are added in the 
simulator files with the associated sensor mode. The reposnsible components for estimating 
the energy consumption readings for Radio and MCU in the simulator are 




4 CHAPTER 4 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURE TINYDDS 
In this chapter, the implementation of adding security measures for middleware TinyDDS 
is explained. Several common security algorithms used in information security are 
considered for the implementation of the modified TinyDDS version. The new structure of 
the middleware components for the modified TinyDDS will be demonstrated to show how 
the security components are integrated into the basic implementation of TinyDDS. 
 
4.1 Security Components 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on evaluating the performance of 
algorithms to secure data in general. Our interest is for those algorithms that are considered 
lightweight and suitable for WSNs as aforementioned in the previous chapter. Some of 
those algorithms are implemented in our work as a Security Service component, and are 
expected to add overhead to the basic TinyDDS middleware. In the implementation of the 
Security Service component, we aim to provide security transparency concerning the 
application development. Hence, the security service is included as an integrated part of 
the middleware. Therefore, there is no need for the WSN applications developers to 
redesign or recode their applications. This allows the normal users with minimum 
knowledge of security functionality to secure the data indirectly through the use of the 
middleware. Accordingly, we target the support of data confidentiality and data integrity 
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through both lightweight and conventional cryptographic algorithms. Figure 5 depicts the 
extended architecture of TinyDDS after supporting the security services.  
 
Figure 5: Extended TinyDDS architecture 
 
The extended architecture for TinyDDS accounts for security through the introduction of 
the Security Service component. In the Security Service component, we have two main 
interfaces, Secure_Info and UnSecure_Info. The Secure_Info interface is invoked at the 
sender node to secure the data received from the L3 Layer of the TinyDDS by applying a 
selected cryptographic algorithm that is implemented in the modified middleware. The first 
task in the Secure_Info interface is applying the authentication process that includes 





















 and verifying their validity through checking the keys expiration time. The authentication 
process is explained in detail in subsection 4.4. The next task involves securing the packet 
through one of the confidentiality algorithms supported in our middleware. These 
algorithms have different characteristics that can change the way how the data is encrypted, 
especially the block size. The last step is to prepare the integrity requirements for the 
encrypted data by applying one of the selected integrity algorithms discussed in subsection 
4.3. The necessary parameters are prepared for calculating the MAC to be compared later 
by the intended receiver node of the communication. At the receiver node, the 
Unsecure_Info interface is invoked. First, it will decrypt the received message, and then 
calculate the MAC from the decrypted data and compare it with the received MAC. It will 
accept the data and pass it to the L3 Layer of the TinyDDS if there is a match. Otherwise 
it will discard it.  
 
4.2 Data Confidentiality requirement 
In data confidentiality, we need to ensure that only authorized parties may have access to 
the exchanged data. The tool that is commonly used to achieve confidentiality is 
encryption. In our implementation, we attempt to construct a secure TinyDDS while 
considering the WSNs regarding source constraints of memory and energy.  
We have considered a number of the block cipher algorithms for inclusion in the 
middleware according to three factors: memory, energy consumption, and security. The 
energy consumption is mainly caused by the computational complexity of the algorithm. 
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Table 6 provides the main parameters for some of suitable candidates for block ciphers 
algorithms discussed in the previous chapter. 
Table 6: General parameters of block cipher algorithms 
Algorithm Key size (bits) Block size (bits) Rounds 
AES [52] 128/192/256 128 10/12/14 
Skipjack [50] 80 64 32 
XXTEA [80] 128 64 14 
RC5 [47] 128 64 14 
PRESENT [81] 80/128 64 31 




32/48/ 64/ 96/128 26/42 
 
Table 7 shows, in general, the main factors to compare between the block cipher 
algorithms. According to Table 7, to achieve the highest security in data confidentiality in 
a middleware AES should be selected. Whereas, if the main concern is saving memory 
space, the SPECK should be selected. Finally, SkipJack is the best choice if the energy 
consumption is concerned. The main implementation of our modified TinyDDS is 
constructed using AES to achieve the maximum security. Intensive simulations and 
scenarios are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.    
Table 7: General comparison of block cipher algorithms 
Algorithm Memory Energy consumption 
AES High Medium 
Skipjack High lowest 
XXTEA Low Medium 
RC5 Medium High 
PRESENT Medium Medium 
PRINCE High Medium 




4.3 Data Integrity requirement 
Data integrity, we need to ensure the detection of unauthorized modification of the 
exchanged data. In many cases it is considered to be more critical than confidentiality. In 
our implementation to support integrity, we select two algorithms, SHA1 which is the 
standard algorithm to construct HMAC, and MMH for its relatively small memory 
occupancy. 
The construction of the HMAC follows the standard HMAC-SHA1 by NIST [74], which 
requires to pass the SHA1 hash algorithm twice. There is secret key, to support the 
authentication of the message as well. The input block size of SHA1 is 64 bytes and the 
output is 20 bytes. The construction of the MAC from HHM algorithm requires a secret 
key for authentication, both the secret key and message have the same length. The size of 
the input block for HHM algorithm is variable, and the size of the output is 4 bytes. 
 
4.4 Authentication and key exchange requirements 
The modified middleware depends on the use of symmetric cryptographic algorithms to 
achieve confidentiality. Furthermore, the message authentication is applied through the use 
of HMAC integrity which depends on the presence of a shared secret key. Accordingly, we 
need a mechanism to exchange the shared secret keys with each session to prevent the reuse 
of the same key. To facilitate the sharing of a secret key, we implemented a key exchange 
protocol inspired by the Kerberos protocol [84]. The advantage of using the devised key 
exchange protocol is that the total number of required keys to securely exchange data 
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between any pair of nodes in the network is equal to the number of network. By 
comparison, the total number of keys needed when using a typical symmetric key 
cryptographic algorithm is 𝑂(𝑁2), where 𝑁 is the number of the network nodes.  However, 
the devised protocol depends on the existence of a trusted-third-party (TTP) that manages 
the exchange of authentication messages between the nodes in the network. 
The base-station node in WSNs is assumed to be the TTP. The publishers’ nodes contact 
the base-station to establish mutual authentication and to obtain shared symmetric session 
key. Every node in the network is assumed to have its private key, which is only shared 
with the base- station. Moreover, the TTP has a private key that is not shared with any other 
node. The nodes’ private keys are only used to achieve mutual authentication with the base-
station node, and establish shared session keys. The session keys have an expiration time 
to force the need for establishing new session keys. The session keys are used to apply the 
confidentiality and integrity when exchanging the data messages between the nodes. 
 
Figure 6 summarizes the devised protocol. Specifically, the first message in Figure 6 (a) 
shows a publisher (node 1) requesting the issuance of an identification ticket (TKT-I) from 
TTP (node 0).  The identification ticket (TKT-I) is used later on to authenticate the 
publisher (node 1) to the TTP (node 0) when the publisher (node 1) wishes to contact either 
the TTP (node 0) as shown in Figure 6 (b), or a subscriber (node x) as shown in Figure 6 
(c). When requesting the issuance of an identification ticket (TKT-I), the publisher (node1) 
sends its ID, ’1’, and a timestamp, 𝑡1. The ID ‘1’ is used by the TTP (node 0) to identify 
the private key, 𝐾1, for the publisher (node 1). On the other hand, the timestamp 𝑡1 is used 
33 
 
to prevent replay attacks [85]. Subsequently, the second message in Figure 6 (a) is sent 
from the TTP (node 0) to the publisher (node 1) which carries the issued TKT-I along with 
the encryption of the TTP ID, ‘0’, the received timestamp, 𝑡1, and the established session 
key, 𝑆1. The encryption uses AES and the publisher’s (node 1) private key, 𝐾1, as identified 
by the TTP (node 0). The issued TKT-I is constructed by encrypting the publisher ID, ‘1’, 
the established session key, 𝑆1, and the expiration time for the established session key, 𝑡𝑠1, 
using the TTP private key, 𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑃. Note that TKT-I can only be decrypted by the TTP (node 
0). Note also that TKT-I contains all necessary information to identify to whom the ticket 
was issued and what was the established session key, 𝑆1, between the TTP (node 0) and 
the publisher (node 1). Hence, once TKT-I is issued and sent to the publisher (node 1), the 
TTP (node 0) can discard the issued TKT-I. Accordingly, the TTP conserve its memory by 
discarding the issued TKT-I once delivered to the intended publisher. 
Once the publisher (node 1) receives the second message in Figure 6 (a), it can then use 
the received TKT-I and 𝑆1to contact either the TTP (node 0) or a subscriber (node x) as 
shown in Figure 6 (b) and Figure 6 (c), respectively. Figure 6 (b) shows how mutual 
authentication is achieved between the TTP (node 0) and the publisher (node 1). 
Specifically, the first message is sent by the publisher (node 1) that carries TKT-I and the 
encryption of a newly generated timestamp, 𝑡1′, using the established session key, 𝑆1. Once 
received, the TTP (node 0) decrypts TKT-I to extract the established session key, 𝑆1, and 
uses it to decrypt and extract the publisher’s (node 1) timestamp, 𝑡1′. Subsequently, the 
TTP (node 0) encrypts its ID, ‘0’, a newly selected timestamp, 𝑡0′, and decrypted and 
extracted the publisher’s (node 1) timestamp, 𝑡1′, using the established session key, 𝑆1. 
Once received, the publisher (node 1) authenticates that the sending side is the TTP (node 
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0) as the publisher’s (node 1) own timestamp, 𝑡1′, is included in the received message. 
Accordingly, the publisher (node 1) sends the third message to TTP (node 0). The third 
message is constructed by encrypting the publisher’s ID, ‘1’, and the TTP timestamp, 𝑡0′, 
using the established session key, 𝑆1. Once received, the TTP (node 0) authenticates the 
sending side is the publisher (node 1) as the TTP’s (node 0) timestamp, 𝑡0′, is included in 
the received message. 
Similarly, Figure 6 (c) shows how mutual authentication is achieved between the publisher 
(node 1) and the subscriber (node x) with the help of TTP (node 0). Precisely, the publisher 
(node 1) send the first message to the TTP (node 0) to request the issuance of a granting 
ticket (TKT-II). The first message carries the ID of the publisher, ‘1’, the ID of the 
subscriber, ‘x’, TKT-I, and the encryption of a newly generated timestamp, 𝑡1
∗ using the 
established session key, 𝑆1. Once received, the TTP decrypts TKT-I to extract the 
established session key, 𝑆1, and uses it to decrypt and extract the publisher’s (node 1) 
timestamp, 𝑡1
∗. Accordingly, the TTP (node 0) issues TKT-II. Moreover, it encrypts the 
TTP ID, ‘0’, a newly established session key between the publisher (node 1) and the 
subscriber (node x), 𝐾1𝑥, the publisher’s timestamp, 𝑡1
∗, and the expiration time for the 
established session key between the publisher and the subscriber, 𝑡𝑠1𝑥, using the extracted 
session key, 𝑆1. Both TKT-II and the result of the encryption are sent by the TTP (node 0) 
to the publisher (node 1) in the second message. TKT-II is constructed by the TTP (node 
0) by encrypting the publisher ID, ‘1’, the newly established session key, 𝐾1𝑥,and the 
expiration time for the established session key, 𝑡𝑠1𝑥, using the subscriber private key, 𝐾𝑥. 
Note that aside from the TTP only the subscriber (node x) can decrypt TKT-II. Once 




∗, is included in the encrypted part of the message. Accordingly, the publisher 
extracts the established session key, 𝐾1𝑥 . At this point, the publisher (node 1) can use both 
TKT-II and the established session key, 𝐾1𝑥 , to contact the subscriber (node x). Thus, the 
third, fourth, fifth messages presented in Figure 6 (c) serve the same purpose as those 
presented in Figure 6 (b). 
 
(a) Ticket request. 
 
(b) Request to contact TTP. 
 
(c) Request to contact node ‘x’ 
Figure 6: Messages flow of the protocol for authentication and session key exchange 
 
Figure 7 shows two common types of attacks in WSNs. Figure 7 (a) presents the Man-in-
the-middle attack, and Figure 7 (b) presents the Impersonate attack. Figure 7 (c) shows the 
symbols represented in the network. Our devised protocol for mutual authentication and 
key exchange is immune to these types of attacks. We will refer to Figure 6 and which 
message number the attack fails for all possible scenarios in the two attacks explained next. 
Regarding the Impersonate attack, a node in the network pretends to be another node in the 
network. There are four possible scenarios for the attacker node. Figure 7 (a) shows the 
four cases associated with a label number. The first case, the attacker node A, pretends to 
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be the TTP node. The attacker fails at message number 2 in Figure 6 (a), by failing to send 
back the encrypted timestamp, 𝑡1
 , since only node 1 and node TTP share the secret key, 
𝐾1, as shown in Figure 7 (d). In the second case, the attacker node A, pretends to be a 
Publisher node and tries to be authenticated as node 1 for instance, as shown in Figure7 
(a.2).  The attacker fails at message number 1 in Figure 6 (b), by failing to send the 
encrypted newly generated timestamp  𝑡1′
  with the common session key 𝑆1, which is part 
of TKT-I, as shown in Figure 7 (e). The third case, the attacker pretends to be a Subscriber 
node, as for example node x.  The attacker fails at message number 4 in Figure 6 (c), by 
failing to send back the encrypted  𝑡1′
  with the common session key 𝐾1𝑥, that only node 1 
and node x share, as shown in Figure 7 (e). The last case, the attacker node pretends to be 
a Publisher node, as for example node 1. The attacker fails at message number 3 in Figure 
6 (c), by failing to send the encrypted  𝑡1′
  with the common session key 𝐾1𝑥 , which is part 
of TKT-II that only node 1 and node x share, as shown in Figure 7 (f). 
Regarding the man-in-the-middle attack, there are two possible cases for the attacker node. 
Figure 7 (b) shows the two cases associated with a label number. The first case, the attacker 
node is between the Publisher node and the TTP node. The attacker fails at message number 
2 in Figure 6 (a), by failing to send back the encrypted  𝑡1
  with the key 𝐾1, that only node 
1 and node x share, as shown in Figure 7 (g). The second case, the attacker node is between 
the Publisher node and a Subscriber node, as for example node x. The attacker fails at 
message number 4 in Figure 6 (c), by failing to send back the encrypted  𝑡 1
 
 with the session 










(b) Man-in-the-middle attack  
 
(c) Symbols from left to right: Subscriber, Publisher, 
Attacker node 
 
(d) Impersonate attack case 1  
 
(e) Impersonate attack case 2 
 
(e) Impersonate attack case 3 
 
(f) Impersonate attack case 4 
 
(g) Man-in-the-middle attack case 1 
 
(h) Man-in-the-middle attack case 2 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the simulation setup and parameters are provided. The proposed 
implementation of the modified TinyDDS with security integrated will be evaluated and 
compared with the basic TinyDDS results. Several parameter factors are considered in our 
simulations: The memory space occupation for different mote platforms, namely, Mica2, 
MicaZ, Iris, and TelosB. The energy consumption of the whole network is calculated by 
taking the summation of all nodes consumption. Moreover, the end-to-end delay and the 
packet delivery ratio are evaluated for packet transmission. The default QoS parameters 
are considered for the basic and the modified TinyDDS. Furthermore, the reliability QoS 
is set to BEST_EFFORT. Accordingly, reliable data transfer is not guaranteed. 
 
5.1 Simulation setup and parameters 
Several experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the middleware. The 
modified middleware is compared against the basic TinyDDS. Throughout this chapter, the 
term TDDS will be used to refer to the basic implementation of the TinyDDS. Table 8 
illustrates some of the key parameters used in of the simulation. The setup of the simulation 
parameters  is inspired from the work in [78]. The experiments are tested using TOSSIM 
[67] simulator over a MicaZ mote platform, the radio model of the MicaZ mote is based 
on Chipcon CC420 model. 
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Table 8: Simulation parameters. 
Parameter Value 
Topology Square grid 
Area 100x100 Meter2 
Number of Nodes 25 
Simulation time 500 seconds 
Mote platform MicaZ 
Radio model Chipcon CC420 
Data rates 
0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8 
packet/second 
Number of publishers 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 24 
Packet payload size 16, 32, 48 bytes 
Data point reading 10 times 
 
The application to be used in our experiments is simply collecting readings from nodes 
called Publishers. The flowchart of the application is depicted in Figure 8. The readings 
are aggregated locally at the publishing nodes, then the average of these readings is sent to 
other nodes, called Subscribers. In our scenario, we have only one Subscriber which is also 
considered to be the Base-station, and a variable number of Publishers. We study the effect 
of increasing the number of Publishers from 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 to 24 to evaluate the performance 
of the network and monitor the scalability. The network traffic load varies by changing the 
data rate. The data rate varies in our tests from 0.5 to 8 packets per second. When the data 
rate is 8 packets/second the traffic is expected to be very high, and the packet loss increases, 




Figure 8: Application function in the middleware 
The topology of the network considered in our experiments is a square grid topology to 
reduce the simulation time required for our test scenarios. The network topology is 
illustrated in Figure 9, where we have a square grid network of 25 nodes that are uniformly 
distributed in a 100x100 square meter area. The node at the lower corner with ID 0 is the 
only Subscriber and is considered to be the base-station, and the square-shaped nodes are 
the Publishers. The remaining nodes are relay nodes that are used for packet forwarding 
purpose according to the routing protocol. Different scenarios are considered for the 
number of Publishers in our experiments. The nodes are distributed in a way that the path 
from the Publisher node is as far or symmetric-shaped as possible to the Subscriber node. 
The distribution of the nodes is not critical as we are investigating the effect on 
performance for the secure and unsecure middleware cases using the same network 
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considered to be a Subscriber and the remaining nodes act as Publishers. The TinyDDS 
middleware follows DDS standards. Therefore, for simplicity, we have one topic value 
which the Subscriber is interested in, according to the pub/sub functionality. The topic 
represents the data that the sensor nodes are collecting, for example, temperature, pressure, 
humidity or GPS location. In our experiments, our topic value is temperature, but the 
middleware is reading it as a random value. 
There will be multiple secured versions for the modified-TinyDDS middleware. We 
investigate a number of block ciphers (AES, SPECK and PRINCE) and hash algorithms 
(MMH and SHA1) according to the recommendations provided in the previous chapter. 
We consider the memory constraints, to enable the middleware to work normally with 
limited memory motes, such as Arduino Pro and TelosB. For all versions of secured 





(a) One Publisher (d) Eight Publishers 
  
(b) Two Publishers (e) Sixteen Publishers 
 
 
(c) Four Publishers 
(f) Symbols from left to right: Subscriber, Publisher, 
Relay node 
Figure 9: Different scenarios showing the network grid Topology with changing in number of publishers. 
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5.2 Simulation results and analysis 
In our evaluation study to estimate overhead after adding security measurements to 
TinyDDS middleware, we perform several experiments by mainly using TOSSIM 
simulator and MicaZ mote platform. The main performance metrics considered are 
Memory occupancy of the middleware, Packet Delivery Ratio, Latency or End-to-end 
delay, and total energy consumption.  
5.2.1 Memory Occupancy metric 
This metric is evaluated by compiling the code of the middleware, and the application 
tested on top of the TinyOS. The application is simply, reading a sensor value from a 
publisher node to be sent to the base station, i.e. the subscriber node. Two versions of the 
code for the middleware are prepared to study the effect of adding security measure. The 
first one is the basic TinyDDS, and the other one is the modified-TinyDDS with security 
measures. As stated earlier, there are multiple implementations of the modified-TinyDDS, 
to account for different security algorithms. The first security implementation adds the AES 
algorithm as component to ensure data confidentiality. 
 There are four mote platforms considered in this test. Namely, Mica2, MicaZ, IRIS, and 
TelosB. The memory amount requirement is different for each mote platform. The 
compilation process for preparing the executable image of the code, reveals the required 




The memory space for TelosB mote is 48KB and 10KB of ROM and RAM, respectively. 
Hence, Table 9 provides the full TelosB memory occupancy of the basic TinyDDS and the 
modified TinyDDS after adding the confidentiality using AES algorithm. It can be seen 
from the table that the amount of memory needed for the middleware and the testing 
application is 23324 bytes for the ROM and 5952 bytes for the RAM. Equivalently, they 
require a total requires 47.5% and 58.1% of the overall memory available in the mote for 
ROM and RAM, respectively. The percentage of the contribution after adding AES 
components is 8.1% of the ROM and 17.7% of the RAM. Hence, the percentage of the 
remaining memory is 44.4% of 48KB and 24.2% of 10KB for ROM and RAM, 
respectively. Furthermore, Figure 10 depicts the percentage difference of the memory 
occupancy between the basic TinyDDS and the modified-TinyDDS for TelosB mote. 
Table 9: Memory occupancy for TelosB mote. 
 Memory Occupancy 
 ROM (B) RAM (B) ROM (%) RAM (%) 
Application and MW 23324 5952 47.5 58.1 
Adding AES 4014 1810 8.1 17.7 
Remaining Memory 21814 2478 44.4 24.2 





(a) ROM occupancy (b) RAM occupancy 
Figure 10: Memory usage for Basic TinyDDS and Modified-TinyDDS based on TelosB mote with 
confidentiality. 
The test code is also applied on three other motes. Table 10 is summarizing the memory 
results after applying the test. We notice that the MicaZ mote requires the most amount of 
ROM memory to install the test code, whereas TelosB requires the least amount of ROM 
memory space to install the code. However, TelosB requires the most amount of RAM 
memory to install the test code, whereas Mica2 requires the least amount of RAM memory 
space to install the code. 
Table 10: Memory occupancy for different motes (size in bytes). 
 Security Off (TDDS) Security On (TDDS_AES) 
 ROM RAM ROM RAM 
MicaZ 30002 5806 35288 7616 
Mica2 26734 5710 32350 7520 
IRIS 28740 5897 33546 7709 
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So far confidentiality has only been applied to the basic TinyDDS middleware. However, 
applying confidentiality without integrity has been proven insecure in previous studies. 
The first algorithm for integrity which has been investigated in our study is SHA1. Table 
11 shows the detail distribution of memory occupancy after adding the SHA1 components 
to support the integrity measure. It is apparent from this table that the contribution to the 
ROM occupancy of adding integrity components with SHA1 algorithm is equal half of the 
contribution of adding confidentiality components with AES algorithm. The remaining 
memory is 39.5% and 20% for ROM and RAM, respectively. Furthermore, Figure 11 
depicts the percentage difference of the memory occupancy between basic the TinyDDS 
and the modified-TinyDDS for TelosB mote after adding AES for confidentiality and 
SHA1 for integrity components. 
 
 
Table 11: Memory occupancy for TelosB mote with confidentiality and integrity (SHA1). 
 Memory Occupancy 
 ROM (B) RAM (B) ROM (%) RAM (%) 
App. and MW 23324 5952 47.5 58.1 
Adding AES 4014 1810 8.2 17.7 
Adding SHA 2376 434 4.8 4.2 
Remain. Memory 19438 2044 39.5 20.0 





(a) ROM occupancy (b) RAM occupancy 
Figure 11: Memory usage for Basic TinyDDS and Modified-TinyDDS based on TelosB mote with 
confidentiality and integrity (SHA1). 
 
In similar steps, to make more memory space available, we have investigated the use of 
another algorithm to produce the MAC mechanism as aforementioned in the previous 
chapter. The integrity components are constructed by using the MMH algorithm. Table 12 
provides an overview of the significant reduction in the memory occupation as a result of 
using the MMH algorithm. The contribution of using SHA1 is clearly larger than MMH. 
As can be seen from the data in the table that the percentage of memory required to add the 
MMH algorithm is 1.4% and 0.7% for ROM and RAM, respectively. On the other hand, 
the percentage of memory needed to add SHA1 is 4.8% and 4.2% for ROM and RAM, 
respectively. Figure 12 shows the percentage difference of the memory occupancy between 
the basic TinyDDS and the modified-TinyDDS for the TelosB mote after adding AES for 
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Table 12: Memory occupancy for TelosB mote with confidentiality and integrity (MMH). 
 Memory Occupancy 
 ROM (B) RAM (B) ROM (%) RAM (%) 
App. and MW 23324 5952 47.5 58.1 
Adding AES 4014 1810 8.2 17.7 
Adding MMH 710 74 1.4 0.7 
Remain. Memory 21104 2404 42.9 23.5 




(a) ROM occupancy (b) RAM occupancy 
Figure 12: Memory usage for Basic TinyDDS and Modified-TinyDDS based on TelosB mote with 
confidentiality and integrity (MMH). 
 
5.2.2 Energy Consumption metric 
The energy consumption of the sensor nodes is one of the important metrics for WSNs 
performance evaluation. In our experiments, the energy consumption is calculated by 
taking the summation of the energy consumption of all nodes in the network in milli-Joule 
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components that directly contribute to the energy consumption are the Radio and 
Microcontroller (MCU). 
Following the same setup of the experiment’s parameters as earlier, a comparison in 
performance behavior between the basic TinyDDS and the modified versions of TinyDDS 
that account for security measures are presented. Two versions of the modified TinyDDS 
are investigated. The main algorithm for our study is AES which achieves maximum 
security with respect to data confidentiality. Whereas the main algorithm to achieve 
maximum security with respect to data integrity is SHA1. Since SHA1 requires a 
considerable memory space as demonstrated in the previous section, MMH is investigated 
as well. We have studied the performance of the middleware in the simulation runs while 
changing the number of Publishers from 1 to 24 (full load). The Publisher node is 
responsible for causing data traffic.  
Throughout this work, the term TDDS will refer to the basic TinyDDS, and the term 
TDDS_X_Y will refer to the modified TinyDDS with X as the confidentiality algorithm 
and Y as the integrity algorithm.  Figure 13 provides a comparison of energy consumption 
between TDDS and TDDS_AES_SHA1, while changing the number of Publishers when 
the data rate is one packet/s. As shown in Figure 13 (a) for MCU, there was no significant 
difference between TDDS and TDDS_AES_SHA1. That is because the contribution of the 
security components for energy consumption in MCU is in the scale of micro-Joules (𝜇𝐽). 
On the other hand, Figure 13 (b), shows a clear difference in the energy consumption in 
the Radio component as the number of the Publishers increases from 8 to 24, and a slight 
difference as the number of the Publishers increases from 1 to 4. The packet payload size 
for TDDS_AES_SHA1 48 bytes which is larger than the packet payload size for TDDS 16 
50 
 
bytes. This is due to encryption and additional MAC bytes. As a result, the energy 
consumption for TDDS_AES_SHA1 is larger. Moreover, increasing the number of 
Publishers results in an increase in the traffic in the network.  
  
(a) MCU (b) Radio 
Figure 13: Energy consumption comparison between TDDS and TDDS_AES_SHA1 when the data rate is 
1p/s. 
 
Similarly, Figure 14 provides a comparison of energy consumption when the data rate is 
1p/s, but this time the TDDS_AES_MMH is added to the comparison. Figure 14 (a) has a 
similar MCU observation as the one obtained from Figure 14 (a). Also, from Figure 14 (b), 
we can see that using MMH as an integrity algorithm results in a reduction in the radio 
energy consumption as compared to using SHA1. The reason for that is the reduction in 
size of payload for the packet from 48 bytes when using SHA1 to 32 bytes when using 













































(a) MCU (b) Radio 
Figure 14: Energy consumption comparison for all MW versions when the data rate is 1p/s. 
 
Furthermore, we conducted additional simulation runs where we change the data rate from 
0.5 p/s to 8 p/s to study the effect of the traffic load in the network for all versions of the 
middleware. As shown in Figure 15, the MCU results are almost identical for all versions 
of the middleware as we observed earlier. Also, for the readings of each middleware 
version, there is a slight increase in the MCU energy consumption while the data rate 
changes from 0.5 p/s to 8 p/s. For the Radio energy consumption, the effect of applying 
different data rates is evident following the same trend for all middleware versions. In every 















































(a) Results for TDDS: MCU and Radio 
  
(b) Results for TDDS_AES_SHA1: MCU and Radio 
  
(c) Results for TDDS_AES_MMH: MCU and Radio 
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5.2.3 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) metric 
Packet delivery ratio gives an indication of the system behavior towards stability. This 
metric is evaluated using TOSSIM simulator by dividing the total number of successfully 
received packets at the Subscriber node(s) by the total number of packets sent from the 
Publisher node(s). In all middleware versions, the QoS Reliability parameter is set to 
BEST_EFFORT in our simulation setup. Therefore, reliable data transfer of data is not 
guaranteed. Whereas, if the QoS Reliability parameter is set to RELIABLE, then the data 
will be reliably delivered to the Subscriber(s). As Such, the value of PDR will always be 
one, but this will result in extra overhead to the network traffic. 
Figure 16 provides a comparison of the PDR value when the data rate is 1p/s. Figure 16 (a) 
shows that the PDR for TDDS is over 0.8 in most cases for all Publishers number except 
for when it is 24 (full load). Contrary to initial expectation, there is an increase in the PDR 
when increase from 1 to 2. This can be attributed to the location of the Publisher nodes for 
the two cases. In the case of 1 Publisher, the location is at the far end of the network, 
whereas the second case one of the two Publishers is closer to the Subscriber. This 
observation is also true for in the case of 4 Publishers, but with a very slight increase. 
Although there is a Publisher at the far end like case 1, the contribution of successfully 
received packets of the closer nodes to the Subscriber mitigates the remote nodes packet 
loss. The traffic congestion in the case of 8 Publishers and onward, starts to impact the 
PDR and the packet loss is at the highest point in the case of 24 Publishers. Similarly, 
TDDS_AES_SHA1 follows the same trend, but in every case the value of the PDR is lower 
than the TDDS PDR results. The size of the packet in TDDS_AES_SHA1 is longer than 
that of the TDDS, and that contributes to the packet loss. Figure 16 (b) shows the results 
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after adding TDDS_AES_MMH to the comparison. As expected, it follows the same trend, 
and performs better than TDDS_AES_SHA1 in most cases. 
  
(a) TDDS vs TDDS_AES_SHA1 (b) All three MW versions 
Figure 16: Packet delivery ratio comparison for all MW versions when the data rate is 1p/s. 
 
Figure 17 compares the results obtained from changing the data rate from 0.5 p/s to 8 p/s 
for all cases. It is clear from the figure that the change is almost constant when the data rate 
is 0.5 p/s for all cases. The PDR value decreases when the data rate increases and the packet 
loss is very high when the data rate reaches 8 p/s. In all Publishers cases, 



















































(a) Results for TDDS 
 
(b) Results for TDDS_AES_SHA1 
 
(c) Results for TDDS_AES_MMH 
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5.2.4 End-to-End Delay metric 
The End-to-End Delay (EED) metric is a good indicator for the impact of adding security 
measure on the WSN performance. The EED includes processing, transmission, and 
security computation delay of the packets. The EED is calculated by taking the average 
delay of all successfully received messages by the subscriber node. 
Figure 18 provides a comparison of the EED value when the data rate is 1p/s. Figure 18 (a) 
shows the EED comparison between TDDS and TDDS_AES_SHA1. It is clear that the 
delay decreases as the number of Publishers increases from 1 to 16. The location of the 
Publisher impacts the EED delay. The farther the distance of the Publisher from the 
Subscriber the longer the time the packets need to arrive at the Subscriber. In the 1 
Publisher case, the Publisher is at the far end in the network away to the Subscriber, while 
in the 2 Publishers case, one of the two Publishers is closer from the Subscriber. In the case 
of the 24 Publishers, which is a full load traffic, the delay slightly increases. It can be 
attributed to the increase in buffering and processing at the relay nodes for the packets that 
take the same path to the Subscriber. It should be noted the TDDS_AES_SHA1 EED 
follows the same behavior as the TDDS EED, but in all cases Publishers it takes longer 




(a) TDDS vs TDDS_AES_SHA1 (b) All three MW versions 
Figure 18: End-to-End delay comparison for all MW versions when the data rate is 1p/s. 
 
Figure 19 compares the EED results obtained from changing the data rate from 0.5 p/s to 
8 p/s for all cases. It is apparent from the figure that all versions have similar plot trend. 
When the number of Publishers increases from 1 to 16, the value of the EED decreases for 
all data rates. Also, the value of EED is almost the same, but with a slight difference for 
data rate 8 p/s when the number of Publisher is 8 and 16, the value of EED is less than the 
other data rate. It can be attributed to the effect of the increase in the packet loss for the 
packets coming from the farther nodes when the data rate increases. However, when the 
number of Publishers is 24 (full load) the value of the EED increases as the network 
congestion affects the processing time at relay nodes of all packets that take the same path 
to the Subscriber. At full load, the network congestion effect may have more impact on the 
overall delay than the packet loss of the packets arriving from the remote nodes. It leads to 






































(a) Results for TDDS 
 
(b) Results for TDDS_AES_SHA1 
 
(c) Results for TDDS_AES_MMH 
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5.3 Results of applying truncation for MAC in Integrity 
The MAC truncation is usually applied in WSNs to improve the performance network. The 
concern of this method is in losing the level of security due to increasing the probability of 
collisions as mentioned in subsection 3.2. Thus, it can be applied to produce 4 bytes MAC 
from 20 bytes HMAC-SHA1. The size of the input block in the standard SHA1 algorithm 
is 64 bytes, and the output block size is 20 bytes. We have applied some variations as 
explained next when using MAC truncation. The result of truncation is 4 bytes, and the 
variations are on whether to encrypt the MAC or leave it without encryption. 
Figure 20 presents the results of applying the variations of truncation when the data rate is 
0.5 p/s. Each line in the figure reflects the variations of applying MAC truncation. There 
are five versions of the middleware; TDDS, TDDS_Tr4B, TDDS_Tr4B_ENC, 
TDDS_FULL, and. TDDS_FULL_ENC. TDDS represents the basic TinyDDS which has 
by default 16 bytes of packet size. While the TDDS_Tr4B is the modified version of the 
middleware where the truncation is 4 bytes with no encryption resulting in a total packet 
size of 20 bytes. On the other hand, TDDS_Tr4B_ENC is the encrypted truncated 4 bytes 
middleware version, resulting in a total packet size of 32 bytes. TDDS_FULL uses the full 
20 bytes MAC that is produced by the SHA1 resulting in a total packet size of 36 bytes. 
The last version is TDDS_FULL_ENC, which is the encrypted version of TDD_FULL 
resulting in a in 48 bytes packet. TDDS_FULL_ENC provides the highest level of security 
and it is the secure middleware using HMAC-SHA1 for integrity version that was presented 
in the figures presented in section 5.2. Figure 20 shows a considerable reduction in the 
energy consumption and the end-to-end delay results when comparing TDDS_Tr4B with 
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TDDS_FULL_ENC. The results for the later middleware version are almost equal to the 
basic TindyDDS results. The difference in the packet delivery ratio results for the different 
middleware versions is negligible since the data rate used is low. Therefore, the packet loss 
is minimized. The security level is not the same for the different middleware versions. 
Therefore, selecting which version to choose will have an impact on final the results. 
 
(a) Energy consumption 
 














































(c) Packet delivery ratio comparison 
Figure 20: Results of MAC truncation  
 
5.4 Results of applying other lightweight block ciphers 
In this section, we investigate using some of the recommended lightweight block cipher 
algorithms to study their effect in our implementation as mentioned in subsection 3.2. We 
compare the lightweight block ciphers results with the results of AES which was used to 
achieve confidentiality in our modified TinyDDS middleware. The same simulation 
parameters are applied for the network configuration setup. The lightweight block ciphers 
considered are, Speck-Simon, Present, and Prince. They are selected due to their advantage 
mainly in the security level and in the memory requirement. The minimum acceptable key 
size for our implementation is 128 bits. Table 13 provides an overview of the memory 
occupancy of the selected lightweight block ciphers as compared to the standard AES 
algorithm. Accordingly to Table 10, the block cipher algorithm that requires the least 
memory is the Speck-Simon algorithm. It requires less than half of the memory required 
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requires more ROM memory than the other algorithms while a very low amount of RAM 
memory.  
Table 13: Memory Occupancy of lightweight block ciphers. 
 ROM (Bytes) RAM (Bytes) ROM (%) RAM (%) 
TDDS 23324 5952 47.5 58.1 
AES  4014 1810 8.2 17.7 
Speck  1798 736 3.6 7.2 
Present  3792 1664 7.7 16.2 
Prince  6024 1112 12.3 10.9 
 
Using the same simulation parameters, the performance of the network using the selected 
light block ciphers is evaluated. The size of the input block for encryption contributes 
directly to the packet size. The benefit of lightweight block cipher over AES is in the 
smaller block size requirement. That is, the resultant packet length is when using the 
lightweight block ciphers. The minimum block size of AES algorithm is 128 bits, whereas, 
the block size of Speck algorithm can be 32,48,64,96 or 128 bits. We found that using a 
block of size 32 bits can reduce the overall packet size to be just 36 bytes, whereas using 
AES algorithm, the size of the packet is 48 bytes when applying full MAC with encryption. 
The block size of Prince and Present is 64 bits. Similarly, the size of the resultant packet is 
40 bytes. Since both algorithms have the same block size, we provide the results of only 
the Present algorithm, especially that it requires less memory than the Prince algorithm. 
The size of the original packet for the basic TinyDDS is 16 bytes. The data rate used in the 
performance evaluation of the results is 1 p/s. 
Figure 21 shows the results after using the Speck lightweight block cipher algorithm. The 
Speck algorithm results follow the same graph trend of the TDDS results. Similarly, Figure 
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22 shows the results after using the Present lightweight block cipher algorithm. However, 
the results of the Speck algorithm and the Present algorithm are less than the results of the 
AES algorithm, which is presented when we combine all results on the same figure, 
especially, for the Radio consumption and end-to-end delay results. 
  
  


























































































Figure 22: Results for using Present lightweight block cipher. 
 
Figure 23 shows the results of the AES, Present, and Speck algorithms when the data rate 
is 1p/s. It can be seen that the results of AES are the highest while the results of the Speck 
algorithm are the lowest. This confirms the advantage of using a lightweight block ciphers 

























































































(a) Radio energy consumption. 
 
(b) End-to-end delay 














































5.5 Network size impact on performance 
In this section, we investigate the impact of network size on the performance results. The 
performance results reported so far were for a network size of 5x5. Accordingly, we 
consider two more network sizes, 3x3 and 4x4, while maintaining the same distance 
between the nodes as in the case of 5x5 network size. Following the same notations as 
previous, Figures 24 and 25 show the distribution of the nodes and the location of the Base-
station and the Publishers for network size 4x4 and 3x3, respectively. 
Following the same simulation parameters used for the 5x5 network size, we produce the 
results for three confidentiality algorithms, namely, AES, Present and Speck, and two 
integrity algorithms, SHA1 and MMH. The data rate used to produce the results is 1p/s to 
reduce the overall simulation time, and the packet delivery ratio is almost constant when 
increasing the number of publishers. Figures 26-28 demonstrate the results for the network 
size of 4x4. Similarly, Figures 29-31 demonstrate the results for the network size of 3x3. 
The results of network size 4x4 and 3x3 are following the same general trend for the results 
of network size 5x5. As in contributing to the extra overhead of the modified middleware 
compared with the basic middleware. The results for each confidentiality algorithm is 
produced separately and plot in the same figure for both integrity algorithms, SHA1 and 
MMH. The results of supporting integrity with SHA1 are contributing on more overhead 
than when supporting integrity with MMH algorithm, as observed from the results of the 






Figure 24: 4x4 Network distribution. 
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Figure 31: Speck results for 3x3 network. 
Scaling the size of the network maintains the same results trend when comparing them 
regarding of the two integrity algorithms for each of the confidentiality algorithms. 
However, the observation in the EED results for the network size of 3x3 in Figures 29-31 
is not similar when comparing them with the network size of 5x5. The delay does not 
decrease as the number of Publishers increases from 1 to 8 as expected and observed from 
the network size of 5x5. On the contrary, the value of EED is the lowest when we have 
only one Publisher in the network, which is observed for all confidentiality algorithms. For 
the network size of 4x4, the value of EED is roughly the same when the number of 
Publishers is 1 and 2, but similar to the network size of 5x5, the value of EED decreases as 























































































5.6 Authentication and key exchange support cost 
The authentication and key exchange process must be completed before exchanging data 
messages in the network. The key exchange is needed when the validity of the key expires. 
The frequency of initiating the key exchange protocol depends on the duration of the 
session key expiration time, and impacts the overall energy cost. To estimate the cost of 
one operation of authentication and key exchange, we assumed two scenarios, best-case 
and worst case. The best-case scenario happens when the publisher node is a direct 
neighbor to the TTP node, whereas the worst-case scenario happens when the publisher 
node is at the far end of the 5x5 network, node ID 24. We estimate the energy consumption 
of the network as in previous experiments. The authentication and key exchange messages 
are sent repeatedly for different number of times, then the average for both cases is taken. 
The number of repetitions used are 100, 150, 200, and 400.  The average value of the energy 
consumption of completing one authentication and key exchange messages is 2.17 𝑚𝐽 for 
the best-case scenario, and 4.36 𝑚𝐽 for the worst-case scenario. The memory requirements 
for supporting the protocol in the modified middleware is 656 bytes for ROM and 182 
bytes for RAM, which adds 1.3% and 1.8% on contribution of the modified middleware 







6 CHAPTER 6 
EXTENDED ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we extend the simulation results for additional scenarios. Availability 
support is discussed to be included in the modified version of the middleware. We propose 
a three-broker case for the middleware to reduce the congestion of the packets at a single 
broker solution. The method can be extended to be as cluster-based brokers distributed for 
networks with a large number of nodes. A mathematical approximation model is discussed 
to estimate the energy consumption of the radio transmission for the nodes. Also, a space 
complexity model is investigated to compare the results of the algorithm we used to support 
the modified middleware. Packet loss analysis is performed to study the readings of the 
individual nodes and their direct contribution on the overall values observed. 
6.1 Detail simulation results 
In this section, more detail regarding the simulation results and the complete routing paths 
dedicated to every publisher in the network. One of the major strengths of The TinyDDS 
middleware is to allow us to change the implementation of any layer of its architecture. 
Our contribution is mainly to add the security service to the middleware architecture. To 
investigate and study the system, we can track all messages sent from any node along 
routing paths until they reach the base station. Therefore, the Id-based [86] routing 
algorithm is used for the network routing in the simulation. It is designed for grid topology 
network distribution. It ensures the packets to take the shortest path. In which, the route 
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moves diagonally until it reaches the destination row or column, and then it moves 
horizontally or vertically respectively, to reach the destination node. Figure 32 shows the 
distribution the Publishers in the network for all the cases. Table 16 shows the detail routing 
paths, and the number hops needed to reach the destination, for all the nodes according to 
the Id-based routing algorithm. The TinyDDS in our implementation is a broker-based. 
The broker node acts as a central node, to forward the messages from the publishers to the 
subscribers. This method is to support the decoupling properties of the middleware. The 
broker node is set to node 6 in our simulation results, to allow us to track the messages 
along the routing paths. We collected the simulation results for publishing rate one msg/s 
for all versions of the secured middleware and compared it with the basic implementation. 
The reliability of delivering packets is set to be the best effort. The drop in the packet is 
due to signal interference between the nodes. The capacity of the transferring the messages 
over the radio will be explained in a separate section later. The following discussion is for 
the results of basic TinyDDS implementation that are shown in Figure 33. In the results, 
there is always a drop in the number of received messages that can reach 5% of the total 
sent messages. The parameter is set to best effort; there is no retransmission of the lost 
messages. Later on, we investigate improving the radio and channel parameters, so that we 
eliminate that the lost messages are due to the radio connectivity. Decreasing the distance 
between the nodes and increasing their gain power leads to reducing the number of dropped 
packets. It is applied by giving the TOSSIM simulator the topology in a file, which creates 
realistic values. With a Python script, we can load values and store them into the radio 
object. For example, the Python script reads the file which specifies each link in between 
the nodes as a line with three values, the source, the destination, and the gain. The line in 
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the file as the following: “1  2 -54.0”, means that when node ID_1 transmits, node ID_2 
hears it at -54 dBm. 
 Table 14 shows the parameters to specify the topology of our network to generate the 
values for the nodes in the first column, and a description of the parameters, in the second 
columns. Table 15 shows part of the values from the file that is generated from the 
parameters of the network topology. 
Table 14: Simulator tool parameters for the channel and the radio 
PATH_LOSS_EXPONENT = 4.7;  
SHADOWING_STANDARD_DEVIAT
ION = 3.2;  
D0 = 1.0;  
PL_D0 = 55.4;  
 
NOISE_FLOOR = -105.0;  
S11 = 0.9;  
S12 = -0.7;  
S21 = -0.7;  
S22 = 1.2;  
WHITE_GAUSSIAN_NOISE = 4; 
NUMBER_OF_NODES =25;  
 
Channel Parameters: 
PATH_LOSS_EXPONENT: the rate at 
which signal decays. 
SHADOWING_STANDARD_DEVIAT
ION: the randomness of the received 
signal due to multipath. 
D0: reference distance (usually 1 meter). 
D0 also determines the minimum 
distance allowed between any pair of 
nodes. 
PL_D0: power decay in dB for the 
reference distance D0. 
Radio Parameters: 
WHITE_GAUSSIAN_NOISE: standard deviation 
of the additive white Gaussian noise. 
NOISE_FLOOR: radio noise floor in dBm. 
Moreover, the variances of the output power and 
noise floor on a per-node basis are given by the 
covariance matrix S = [S11 S12; S21 S22]: 
S11: variance of the noise floor. 
S12: covariance between the noise floor and output 
power (captures correlation). 
S21: equal to S12. 






Table 15: Network nodes values. 
gain 0 1 -58.15 
gain 1 0 -57.25 
gain 0 2 -64.90 
gain 2 0 -65.61 
gain 0 3 -78.68 
gain 3 0 -77.26 
gain 0 4 -84.08 
gain 4 0 -85.13 
gain 0 5 -53.24 
gain 5 0 -53.94 
gain 0 6 -62.79 
gain 6 0 -61.84 
gain 0 7 -74.15 
gain 7 0 -75.61 
gain 0 8 -79.58 
gain 8 0 -79.82 
gain 0 9 -81.61 
gain 9 0 -83.00 
gain 0 10 -65.92 
gain 10 0 -66.43 
gain 0 11 -74.39 
gain 11 0 -74.51 
gain 0 12 -70.18 
gain 12 0 -72.33 
gain 0 13 -74.85 
gain 13 0 -73.56 
gain 0 14 -80.02 
gain 14 0 -81.01 
gain 0 15 -74.72 
gain 15 0 -72.57 
gain 0 16 -80.77 
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Table 16: Routing detail for all nodes. 
Publisher-ID:1 1-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:2 2-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:3 3-7-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:4 4-8-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:5 5-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:6 6-5-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:7 7-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:8 8-7-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:9 9-8-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:10 10-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:11 11-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:12 12-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:13 13-7-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:14 14-8-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:15 15-11-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:16 16-11-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:17 17-11-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:18 18-12-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:19 19-13-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:20 20-16-11-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:21 21-16-11-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:22 22-16-11-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:23 23-17-11-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:24 24-18-12-6-0  Hops=4 
 
 
Figure 33: PDR results for the 5x5 network. 
The PDR details of the individual publishers for all cases of some publishers, and the 
publishing rate is one msg/s, are as the following: 
 
One Publisher node 24: 
Publisher 24: 
The routing path for the packet is: 24-18-12-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (24) is 500. The number of messages received 




























Details in the relay nodes in between the path 24-18-12-6-0: 
(24): sent: 500 to (18) Received: 482, sent to (12): 482. 
(12) Received: 454, sent to (6): 454. (6) Received: 437, sent to (0) 437. 
Received: 418. 
Two Publishers node 24 and 20: 
Publisher 24: 
The routing path for the packet is: 24-18-12-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (24) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 405 PDR 0.81 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 24-18-12-6-0: 
(24): sent: 500 to (18) Received: 471, sent to (12): 471. 
(12) Received: 447, sent to (6): 447. (6) Received: 434, sent to (0) 434. 
Received: 405. 
Publisher 20: 
The routing path for the packet is: 20-16-11-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (20) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) is 412 PDR 0.824. 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 20-16-11-6-0:  
(20): sent: 500 to (16) Received: 488, sent to (11): 488. 
(11) Received: 461, sent to (6): 461. (6) Received: 444, sent to (0) 444. 
Received: 412. 
 
Four Publishers node 24, 20, 12, 4: 
Publisher 24: 
The routing path for the packet is: 24-18-12-6-0   
82 
 
The number of messages sent by Publish (24) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 410 PDR 0.82 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 24-18-12-6-0: 
(24): sent: 500 to (18) Received: 473, sent to (12): 473. 
(12) Received: 452, sent to (6): 452. (6) Received: 433, sent to (0) 433. 
Received: 410. 
Publisher 20: 
The routing path for the packet is: 20-16-11-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (20) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) is 412 PDR 0.824. 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 20-16-11-6-0:  
(20): sent: 500 to (16) Received: 477, sent to (11): 477. 
(11) Received: 465, sent to (6): 465. (6) Received: 456, sent to (0) 456. 
Received: 435. 
Publisher 4: 
The routing path for the packet is: 4-8-7-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (4) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 411 PDR 0.822 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 4-8-7-6-0  : 
(4): sent: 500 to (8) Received: 471, sent to (7): 471. 
(7) Received: 447, sent to (6): 447. (6) Received: 432, sent to (0) 432. 
Received: 411. 
Publisher 12: 
The routing path for the packet is: 12-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
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The number of messages sent by Publish (20) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 458 PDR 0.916 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 12-6-0  :  
(12): sent: 500 to (6) Received: 479, sent to (0): 479. 
Received: 458. 
Eight Publishers: node 24,20,12,4,2,10,14,22: 
Publisher 24: 
The routing path for the packet is: 24-18-12-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (24) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber 405 PDR 0.81 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 24-18-12-6-0: 
(24): sent: 500 to (18) Received: 474, sent to (12): 474. 
(12) Received: 453, sent to (6): 453. (6) Received: 435, sent to (0) 435. 
Received: 405. 
Publisher 20: 
The routing path for the packet is: 20-16-11-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (20) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) is 397 PDR 0.794 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 20-16-11-6-0:  
(20): sent: 500 to (16) Received: 447, sent to (11): 447. 
(11) Received: 432, sent to (6): 432. (6) Received: 419, sent to (0) 419. 
Received: 397. 
Publisher 4: 
The routing path for the packet is : 4-8-7-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (4) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 427 PDR 0.854 
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Details in the relay nodes in between the path 4-8-7-6-0  : 
(4): sent: 500 to (8) Received: 474, sent to (7): 474. 
(7) Received: 463, sent to (6): 463. (6) Received: 448, sent to (0) 448. 
Received: 427. 
Publisher 12: 
The routing path for the packet is: 12-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (12) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 437 PDR 0.874 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 12-6-0  :  
(12): sent: 500 to (6) Received: 470, sent to (0): 470. 
Received: 437. 
Publisher 22: 
The routing path for the packet is: 22-16-11-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (22) is 499. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber 338 PDR 0.67735 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 22-16-11-6-0: 
(22): sent: 499 to (16) Received: 483, sent to (11): 483. 
(11) Received: 459, sent to (6): 459. (6) Received: 445, sent to (0) 445. 
Received: 338. 
Publisher 14: 
The routing path for the packet is: 14-8-7-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (14) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 399 PDR 0.79959 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 14-8-7-6-0  :  
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(14): sent: 499 to (8) Received: 471, sent to (7): 471. 
(7) Received: 452, sent to (6): 452. (6) Received: 436, sent to (0) 436. 
Received: 399. 
Publisher 2: 
The routing path for the packet is: 2-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (2) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 450 PDR 0.9 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 2-6-0: 
(2): sent: 500 to (6) Received: 476, sent to (0): 476. 
Received: 450. 
Publisher 10: 
The routing path for the packet is: 10-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (20) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 458 PDR 0.916 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 10-6-0  :  
(10): sent: 500 to (6) Received: 483, sent to (0): 483. 
Received: 458. 
 
Sixteen Publishers: node 24,20,12,4,2,10,14,22,6,7,8,11,13,16,17,18: 
Publisher 24: 
The routing path for the packet is : 24-18-12-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (24) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber 403 PDR 0.806 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 24-18-12-6-0: 
(24): sent: 500 to (18) Received: 471, sent to (12): 471. 
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(12) Received: 447, sent to (6): 447. (6) Received: 425, sent to (0) 425. 
Received: 403. 
Publisher 20: 
The routing path for the packet is: 20-16-11-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (20) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 391 PDR 0.782 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 20-16-11-6-0:  
(20): sent: 500 to (16) Received: 452, sent to (11): 452. 
(11) Received: 431, sent to (6): 431. (6) Received: 413, sent to (0) 413. 
Received: 391. 
Publisher 4: 
The routing path for the packet is: 4-8-7-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (4) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 420 PDR 0.84 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 4-8-7-6-0  : 
(4): sent: 500 to (8) Received: 475, sent to (7): 475. 
(7) Received: 452, sent to (6): 452. (6) Received: 436, sent to (0) 436. 
Received: 420. 
Publisher 12: 
The routing path for the packet is: 12-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (12) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 440 PDR 0.88 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 12-6-0  :  





The routing path for the packet is: 22-16-11-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (22) is 499. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber 341 PDR 0.683367 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 22-16-11-6-0: 
(22): sent: 499 to (16) Received: 468, sent to (11): 468. 
(11) Received: 443, sent to (6): 443. (6) Received: 424, sent to (0) 424. 
Received: 341. 
Publisher 14: 
The routing path for the packet is: 14-8-7-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (14) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 391 PDR 0.783567 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 14-8-7-6-0  :  
(14): sent: 499 to (8) Received: 469, sent to (7): 469. 
(7) Received: 448, sent to (6): 448. (6) Received: 431, sent to (0) 431. 
Received: 391. 
Publisher 2: 
The routing path for the packet is: 2-6-0   
The number of messages sent by Publish (2) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 457 PDR 0.914 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 2-6-0: 





The routing path for the packet is: 10-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (20) is 500. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 453 PDR 0.906 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 10-6-0  :  
(10): sent: 500 to (6) Received: 477, sent to (0): 477. 
Received: 453. 
Publisher 6: 
The routing path for the packet is: 6-5-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (6) is 499. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 449 PDR 0.8998 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 6-5-6-0 :  
(6): sent: 499 to (5) Received: 483, sent to (6): 483. 
Received: 469, sent to (0): 469. (6) Received: 431, sent to (0) 431. 
Received: 449. 
Publisher 7: 
The routing path for the packet is: 7-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (6) is 499. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 465 PDR 0.931864 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 7-6-0 :  
(7): sent: 499 to (6) Received: 478, sent to (0): 478. 
Received: 465. 
Publisher 8: 
The routing path for the packet is: 8-7-6-0   
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Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (8) is 499. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 424 PDR 0.849699 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 8-7-6-0 :  
(8): sent: 499 to (7) Received: 472, sent to (6): 472. 
Received: 457, sent to (0): 457. (0) Received: 424. 
Publisher 11: 
The routing path for the packet is: 11-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (11) is 498. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 447 PDR 0.89759 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 11-6-0  :  
(11): sent: 498 to (6) Received: 474, sent to (0): 474. 
Received: 447. 
Publisher 13: 
The routing path for the packet is: 13-7-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (13) is 498. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 422 PDR 0.84739 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 13-7-6-0  :  
(13): sent: 498 to (7) Received: 463, sent to (6): 463. 
Received: 442, sent to (0): 442. (0) Received: 422. 
Publisher 16: 
The routing path for the packet is: 16-11-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (16) is 498. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 421 PDR 0.845382 
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Details in the relay nodes in between the path 16-11-6-0 :  
(16): sent: 498 to (11) Received: 480, sent to (6): 480. 
Received: 453, sent to (0): 453. (0) Received: 421. 
 
Publisher 17: 
The routing path for the packet is: 17-11-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (17) is 498. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 372 PDR 0.746988 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 17-11-6-0 :  
(17): sent: 498 to (11) Received: 483, sent to (6): 483. 
Received: 465, sent to (0): 465. (0) Received: 372. 
Publisher 18: 
The routing path for the packet is: 18-12-6-0   
Publishing rate is one message per second. The simulation time is 500 seconds. 
The number of messages sent by Publish (18) is 498. The number of messages 
received by Subscriber (0) 428 PDR 0.859438 
Details in the relay nodes in between the path 18-12-6-0  :  
(18): sent: 498 to (12) Received: 472, sent to (6): 472. 
Received: 455, sent to (0): 455. (0) Received: 428. 
We have changed the radio parameters for the simulator to reducing the effect of radio 
interference by improving the transmitting and receiving power between nodes. The gain 
is increased between the nodes. Table 17 shows the new values of the nodes after reducing 




The effect of frequent nodes in the routing path on packet loss, when we examined the 
worst case where the publishing rate is eight msg/s. The PDR for is almost perfect when 
we have one publisher (avg. 10 readings: 0.99925) and two publishers (avg. 10 readings: 
0.999625). At this point, there are no common nodes for the routing paths to Node 6, the 
broker node. In the case of 8 msg/s, the PDR starts drops clearly to (avg. 10 readings: 
0.789045) when we have four publishers. While the PDR starts to drop clearly to (avg. 10 
readings: 0.748308) when we have 16 publishers at the case of 4 msg/s, in the case of 2 
msg/s, the worst PDR value is (avg. 10 readings: 0.894683) when we have the full traffic. 
For the cases when we have one msg/s, 0.5 msg/s and .25/msg/s, the lowest PDR is (avg. 
10 readings:  0.9501) when we have full network traffic. Whereas, The PDR value is almost 
perfect for the rest cases even when we have full traffic network at 0.5 and .25 msg/s. 
Table 17 :Network nodes values to enhance PDR 
gain 0 1 -10.44 
gain 1 0 -11.13 
gain 0 2 -29.60 
gain 2 0 -28.93 
gain 0 3 -32.35 
gain 3 0 -30.37 
gain 0 4 -42.87 
gain 4 0 -42.41 
gain 0 5 -16.18 
gain 5 0 -16.94 
gain 0 6 -14.56 
gain 6 0 -14.74 
gain 0 7 -32.80 
gain 7 0 -30.27 
gain 0 8 -36.10 
gain 8 0 -34.30 
gain 0 9 -42.42 
gain 9 0 -43.09 
gain 0 10 -25.37 
gain 10 0 -25.02 
gain 0 11 -25.40 
gain 11 0 -25.01 
gain 0 12 -28.10 
gain 12 0 -26.79 
gain 0 13 -37.19 
gain 13 0 -38.18 
gain 0 14 -40.91 
gain 14 0 -39.56 
gain 0 15 -32.26 
gain 15 0 -32.65 
gain 0 16 -32.24 
gain 16 0 -30.99 
 
The common nodes in the routing path start to happen when we have four publishers and 
onward where the common nodes are node 12 in addition to the broker node 6. Tables 18 
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shows the number of times each node in the network is included in the routing paths, for 
all cases when we change the number of Publishers. Also, Figure 34 shows the results for 
performance metrics when we improved the radio signals to reduce the message drops. 
 For the case of four Publisher, Table 18(c) shows node 12 is included two times, and node 
6 is included 4 times, for the routing paths of the four Publishers. At node 12, the node is 
a Publisher and at the same time is a relay node at the path for Publisher 24, through node 
18. Therefore, node 12 is Publishing at the rate of 8 msg/s, and as a relay, it receives and 
forwards the messages from node 18 whenever they arrive and ready (processing time) to 
be sent to node 6 throughout the simulation time. At node 6, it is included four times in the 
routing paths, twice from node 12, one time from node 7 and 11; then it forwards the 
messages to the base station.  
For detail messages count at the routing paths in the network during the simulation time, 
the path Publisher-ID:24 24-18-12-6-0: Node 24 sent 3996 messages in 500 seconds. Node 
12 received 3911 messages from node 24. Node 12 received 3809 of the 3911 from node 
18 which belongs to node 24. Node 6 received 3768 that belongs to node 24. 
For the path, Publisher-ID:12 12-6-0: Node 12 Publishes 3997 messages in 500 seconds. 
Node 6 received 3819 that belongs to node 12. 
For the path, Publisher-ID:20 20-16-11-6-0: Node 20 sent 3999 messages. Node 16 
received all of them 3999. Then, Node 11 received from 16, 3990 messages. Only 10 
messages are dropped.  
93 
 
For the path, Publisher-ID:4 4-8-7-6-0: Node 4 Publishes 4000 messages. Node 8 received 
3998, only two dropped. Node 7 received 3981, dropped only 19. Node 6 received 3899, 
dropped 101 messages. 
 
Table 18: The count of a common node in routing paths for all cases. 
(a) One Publisher (d) Eight Publishers 
  
(b) Two Publishers (e) Sixteen Publishers 
  




Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):0  Node(9):0  Node(4):0 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):0  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):0  Node(17):0  Node(12):1  Node(7):0  Node(2):0 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):0  Node(11):0  Node(6):1  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):0  Node(15):0  Node(10):0  Node(5):0 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):1  Node(9):0  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):2  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):1  Node(17):0  Node(12):2  Node(7):2  Node(2):1 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):2  Node(11):2  Node(6):8  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):0  Node(10):1  Node(5):0 
 Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):0  Node(9):0  Node(4):0 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):0  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):0  Node(17):0  Node(12):1  Node(7):0  Node(2):0 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):1  Node(11):1  Node(6):2  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):0  Node(10):0  Node(5):0 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):1  Node(9):0  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):2  Node(13):1  Node(8):3  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):1  Node(17):1  Node(12):3  Node(7):5  Node(2):1 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):3  Node(11):5  Node(6):17  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):0  Node(10):1  Node(5):1 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):0  Node(9):0  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):1  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):0  Node(17):0  Node(12):2  Node(7):1  Node(2):0 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):1  Node(11):1  Node(6):4  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):0  Node(10):0  Node(5):0 
Node(24):1  Node(19):1  Node(14):1  Node(9):1  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):1  Node(18):2  Node(13):2  Node(8):4  Node(3):1 
 Node(22):1  Node(17):2  Node(12):3  Node(7):8  Node(2):1 
 Node(21):1  Node(16):4  Node(11):8  Node(6):25  Node(1):1 
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Figure 34: Results of TDDS with different publishing rates. 
 
 
6.2 Availability support 
In the definition of the Availability requirement for information security, which is the 
ability to ensure access and use of the information anytime and the system remains 
functioning. Denial-of-service attack (DoS) is one of the significant problems that disrupt 
the availability of the system; it occurs when an attacker takes action that prevents 
legitimate users from accessing targeted computer systems, devices or other network 
resources. DoS attacks flood the systems or networks with traffic to overwhelm the victim 
resources and make it difficult or impossible for legitimate users to use them. 
6.2.1 Summary of DoS attacks and defenses: 
DoS attacks and defenses can be categorized according to the layer protocols. In the 
physical layer, Jamming is the primary attack against WSNs. The Defense against it is 
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a DoS attack, it could significantly increase the life of sensor nodes by reducing power 
consumption [87]. Link-layer threats include collisions, interrogation, and packet replay. 
An attacker might choose to execute a denial-of-sleep attack over a simple jamming-based 
DoS attack on a WSN to limit the attack’s duration which prevents the radio from going 
into the sleep mode [88]. The defenses against link-layer threats include, authentication 
and anti-replay protection, detect and sleep, and broadcast attack protection. 
In the network-layer, routing-disruption attacks can lead to DoS attacks in multihop sensor 
networks. The authors in [89] discuss sensor network routing vulnerabilities and attack 
countermeasures. General attacks on routing protocols include spoofing, replaying, or 
altering routing traffic. The link-layer authentication and antireplay can efficiently prevent 
these attacks. 
Threats in the application-layer attack involve injecting false or replayed packets into the 
network at leaf nodes in a path-based DoS attack [90]. As the packet is forwarded to its 
destination, nodes along the path to the base station waste bandwidth and an energy 
transmitting the traffic. This attack can starve the network of legitimate traffic, because it 
consumes resources on the path to the base station, thus preventing other nodes from 
sending data to the base station. Combining packet authentication and anti-replay 
protection prevents these attacks. 
6.2.2 Proposed enhancements and mitigations to the middleware 
The network topology supported in our results squared-grid. Each node upon startup 
creates a list of its neighbor according to its given ID number. The maximum number of 
neighbor is eight for any node in the network. Therefore, each node is aware of its 
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neighbors and restricted it to receive messages from only the neighbors. In TinyOS 
communication, we can restrict to receive messages with a specific size. Any other 
messages with different size will be discarded. The lowest networking layer in TinyOS is 
called active messages (AM), which is implemented over the sensor’s radio. It provides a 
single hop packet transmission and reception. An ID identifies each message, called the 
AM type, an 8-bit integer to identify the message type. Any other value of this ID of the 
received messages will be discarded. The size of exchanged messages is also known 
between the nodes, and so, upon receiving, we check the size, if it matches, the message 
will be processed, otherwise will be discarded. At the point where all above is checked, an 
attacker may pretend to be a neighbor node. However, the try will fail in the message 
authentication mechanism supported in our work along with the message integrity. 
The payload in the middleware is represented as data-structure type that consists of several 
fields. The data fields include the origin node, which is the first node that generated a 
message. Also, the source and the destination data fields, that helps the middleware for 
routing and processing the messages received along the relay nodes. At first, when the 
message is generated, the origin field and the source field are the same value of the node 
ID. The source field will be changed in the relay nodes when the message travels toward 
the destination. Accordingly, when a relay node receives a message, it can check the source 
and the destination, and it will decide whether the message belongs to it or to decide the 
next hop should this message be forwarded to. The routing protocol used in our simulation 
is ID-Based routing, which only needs to know the destination node to decide what is the 
next hop according to the node ID (address). Also, an important data field in the payload 
which is the save the time-related values for the message. Tracking the message during the 
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whole network simulation execution is important. There are also other data fields, that are 
middleware specific such as, the topic type, message type, subject field, and sensor data 
readings field. The total size of the data fields is 16 bytes, the size of the message payload. 
The basic middleware is subjected to routing disruption and replay attacks, as the message 
can be captured, and data fields can be modified. In our modified versions of the 
middleware, we can prevent these types of vulnerabilities. The whole payload message is 
encrypted and accounted for data confidentiality and integrity. Therefore, the information 
about the message routing fields cannot be modified without detection. The data fields in 
payload regarding the time can help us to prevent or mitigate the replay attacks. We can 
add a threshold time, larger than the maximum time for a message to travel from a direct 
neighbor hop. 
Similarly, the value of the time-related field cannot be modified without detection. 
Therefore, we can check the time the messages received at the nodes, when it is larger than 
the threshold value, it will be assumed as a replay or redundant message, then discarded. 
There is a chance for a few redundant messages to go through the threshold period, but 
they can be filtered out later in the application level. The threshold period can be further 
reduced through more investigations. 
In addition, we enhanced the middleware routing paths of the nodes that cause congestion 
in the network to mitigate the effect of traffic. Specifically, when we have full traffic, and 
all nodes are publishing messages, with a high publishing rate, many messages are dropped. 
The basic implementation of the middleware relies on having only one broker (server) node 
to work as a notification service. This node becomes a bottleneck in the system. All 
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published messages have to go through it to reach the Subscriber nodes. Figure 35 shows 
the distribution of the publisher nodes on the brokers available. The new enhancement is 
making the broker as a cluster of brokers. To investigate the effect of the new enhancement, 
we assigned Nodes 1,5, and 6 as the broker system. Before the enhancement, we tracked 
the messages from all publisher nodes and found the routing paths of all of them to reach 
the broker node. All common nodes are collected and shown in section 6.1 Table 18. 
Particular nodes become common for several routing paths. The chance of dropping packet 
for those nodes is very high when the publishing rate is high as in our experiments showed 
for publishing rate of 8 msg/s. As shown in Table 18(f), node 6 is common in 25 routing 
paths, nodes 11 and 7 are common to 8 paths. We made the nodes 1 and 5 as additional 
brokers along with node 6 in the original implementation. We can see the number of 
common routing paths is distributed among them. The routing paths are changed as we 
divided the nodes into three groups each will redirect their original paths to the closest 
broker. Figure 35 shows the distribution of the nodes. Table 19 shows the new routing 
paths for all nodes in the network after adding three brokers. This step results in significant 
improvements on the overall PDR of the network traffic. Some individual nodes, reached 





Figure 35: Three broker nodes, 1,5 and 6 
The results of three brokers solutions are compared with the one broker solution, for the 
performance metrics PDR and EED. The worst case is selected when the publishing rate is 
8 msg/s, where we have the most dropped packets compared to the lower rates. Figure 36 
shows the comparison between the two solutions. The overall PDR for the three-broker 
solution is better the one broker solution. It results in increasing the overall EED while 
increasing the number of publishers. It confirms the previous results, when we increase the 
publishing rate, the number of dropped packets increases from the packet that is coming 
from the farther nodes, due to more hops they travel. Therefore, the closer nodes, contribute 
more in decreasing the overall average EED. 
  
Figure 36: Comparison between broker solutions (8 msgs/s). 
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Table 19:Routing details for both brokers solutions 
One broker (6) Three brokers (1,5,6) 
Publisher-ID:1 1-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:2 2-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:3 3-7-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:4 4-8-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:5 5-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:6 6-5-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:7 7-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:8 8-7-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:9 9-8-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:10 10-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:11 11-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:12 12-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:13 13-7-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:14 14-8-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:15 15-11-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:16 16-11-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:17 17-11-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:18 18-12-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:19 19-13-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:20 20-16-11-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:21 21-16-11-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:22 22-16-11-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:23 23-17-11-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:24 24-18-12-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:1 1-5-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:2 2-1-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:3 3-2-1-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:4 4-3-2-1-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:5 5-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:6 6-1-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:7 7-1-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:8 8-2-1-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:9 9-3-2-1-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:10 10-5-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:11 11-6-1-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:12 12-6-0  Hops=2 
Publisher-ID:13 13-7-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:14 14-8-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:15 15-10-5-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:16 16-10-5-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:17 17-11-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:18 18-12-6-0  Hops=3 
Publisher-ID:19 19-13-7-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:20 20-15-10-5-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:21 21-15-10-5-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:22 22-16-10-5-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:23 23-17-11-6-0  Hops=4 
Publisher-ID:24 24-18-12-6-0  Hops=4 
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Table 20: The count of common node for both brokers solutions. 
One broker (6) Three brokers (1,5,6) 
(a) One Publisher 
  
(b) Two Publishers 
  
(c) Four Publishers 
  
(d) Eight Publishers 
  
(e) Sixteen Publishers 
  
(f) Full publishers 
  
 
6.3 Effective capacity and Energy consumption model 
Environmental factors mainly cause the packet drop in wireless sensor networks. The 
source of the dropped packet happens at two layers, the physical layer, and MAC layer. At 
the physical-layer and in the absence of interfering transmissions, packet delivery 
performance is largely a function of the environment, the particular physical layer coding 
scheme, and individual receiver characteristics. Many factors have an impact on the packet 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):0  Node(9):0  Node(4):0 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):0  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):0  Node(17):0  Node(12):1  Node(7):0  Node(2):0 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):0  Node(11):0  Node(6):1  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):0  Node(15):0  Node(10):0  Node(5):0 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):0  Node(9):0  Node(4):0 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):0  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):0  Node(17):0  Node(12):1  Node(7):0  Node(2):0 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):0  Node(11):0  Node(6):1  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):0  Node(15):0  Node(10):0  Node(5):0 
 Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):0  Node(9):0  Node(4):0 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):0  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):0  Node(17):0  Node(12):1  Node(7):0  Node(2):0 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):1  Node(11):1  Node(6):2  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):0  Node(10):0  Node(5):0 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):0  Node(9):0  Node(4):0 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):0  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):0  Node(17):0  Node(12):1  Node(7):0  Node(2):0 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):0  Node(11):0  Node(6):1  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):1  Node(10):1  Node(5):1 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):0  Node(9):0  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):1  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):0  Node(17):0  Node(12):2  Node(7):1  Node(2):0 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):1  Node(11):1  Node(6):4  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):0  Node(10):0  Node(5):0 
 Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):0  Node(9):0  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):0  Node(3):1 
 Node(22):0  Node(17):0  Node(12):2  Node(7):0  Node(2):1 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):0  Node(11):0  Node(6):2  Node(1):1 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):1  Node(10):1  Node(5):1 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):1  Node(9):0  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):2  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):1  Node(17):0  Node(12):2  Node(7):2  Node(2):1 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):2  Node(11):2  Node(6):8  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):0  Node(10):1  Node(5):0 
 Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):1  Node(9):0  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):1  Node(13):0  Node(8):1  Node(3):1 
 Node(22):1  Node(17):0  Node(12):2  Node(7):1  Node(2):2 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):1  Node(11):0  Node(6):3  Node(1):2 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):1  Node(10):3  Node(5):3 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):1  Node(9):0  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):2  Node(13):1  Node(8):3  Node(3):0 
 Node(22):1  Node(17):1  Node(12):3  Node(7):5  Node(2):1 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):3  Node(11):5  Node(6):17  Node(1):0 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):0  Node(10):1  Node(5):1 
Node(24):1  Node(19):0  Node(14):1  Node(9):0  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):0  Node(18):2  Node(13):1  Node(8):2  Node(3):1 
 Node(22):1  Node(17):1  Node(12):3  Node(7):3  Node(2):3 
 Node(21):0  Node(16):2  Node(11):2  Node(6):8  Node(1):6 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):1  Node(10):4  Node(5):4 
Node(24):1  Node(19):1  Node(14):1  Node(9):1  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):1  Node(18):2  Node(13):2  Node(8):4  Node(3):1 
 Node(22):1  Node(17):2  Node(12):3  Node(7):8  Node(2):1 
 Node(21):1  Node(16):4  Node(11):8  Node(6):25  Node(1):1 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):1  Node(10):1  Node(5):2 
Node(24):1  Node(19):1  Node(14):1  Node(9):1  Node(4):1 
 Node(23):1  Node(18):2  Node(13):2  Node(8):2  Node(3):3 
 Node(22):1  Node(17):2  Node(12):3  Node(7):4  Node(2):5 
 Node(21):1  Node(16):2  Node(11):3  Node(6):11  Node(1):9 
 Node(20):1  Node(15):3  Node(10):6  Node(5):8 
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delivery. The environmental characteristics can cause multi-path signal reception or signal 
attenuation. The spatial separation between the sender and receiver can determine the 
received signal strength. Finally, minor variations in receiver and sender circuitry or battery 
levels can adversely impact on the physical layer functionality.  At the medium access 
layer, interfering transmissions contribute to poor packet delivery performance. Many 
MAC layers contain mechanisms, such as carrier sense and link layer retransmissions, to 
counteract these effects. The application workload determines the traffic generated by 
nodes and hence the efficiency of channel access. Also, the topology affects how many 
nodes might potentially contend for the channel at a given point in time [91]. 
6.3.1 Sensors’ effective capacity and publishing rates 
The authors in [92, 93] show how to calculate the effective data capacities for sensor 
devices that are compliant with the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Their work inspires the 
following discussion. We applied the equation that is related to our work. 
The effective data capacity is defined as the maximum achievable data rate in the absence 
of any cross traffic. In the Carrier-sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA-
CA) scheme, effective data capacity is smaller than the data rate at the physical layer. The 
difference is due to channel access coordination to handle multiple, pipelined packets on 
the path, which incorporates the works of carrier sensing as well as random back-off 
mechanisms [93]. The MicaZ motes is a 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant. It uses the 
Amtel ATMEGA128L micro-controller and ChipCon CC2420 IEEE 802.15.4 compliant 
radios chip. The duration of 2.4 GHz physical layers of 1 byte is 32 µs. Also, the link 
capacity at the physical layer is 250kbps. The maximum size of the Radio packet for 
CC2420 is 128 bytes including its headers and cyclic redundancy check (CRC). 
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When two nodes communicate in the CSMA-CA, the source node has to perform a clear 
channel assessment (CCA) to verify whether the medium is free or not. If the channel is 
free, the node will send out the data frame and wait for an acknowledge frame (optional). 
All other nodes, overhearing this communication, will defer their transmission. In the case 
of an occupied channel, an exponential backoff mechanism is used. 
We need to calculate the effective data capacity for a single-hop connection between 2 
neighbors. Therefore, to calculate the upper bound of the single-hop effective data capacity 
𝐶𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 we need to calculate the time needed between two frames, called 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙, as shown 
in equation (1). Which is the sum of the time needed for the headers overhead 𝑇𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑, 
the waiting time 𝑇𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡, and the time needed to transmit the data payload 𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 . 
There is an overhead regarding the optional acknowledge frames, which is of size 11 bytes. 
The maximum size of the data payload is 128 bytes minus the size of the overhead, which 
12 bytes for the head, and 2 bytes for CRC. Therefore, the size of the data payload is 114 
bytes. The needed to transmit 114 bytes 𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 =   4 ∗  (32µs) = 3.648ms  . 
Similarly, 𝑇𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  4 ∗  (32µs) =  .448ms. The minimum wait time (e.g. from CCA 
time, radi,o turnaround time, and inter-frame interval) is  . 52ms by default of IEEE 
802.15.4 standard. Therefore, 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 3.648 +  .448 +  . 52 = 5.248ms. The 
𝐶𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 is calculated according to equation (2). 𝐶𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 is equal to 250 kbps. Therefore, 
the upper bound of the single-hop effective data capacity is 173.78 kbps. This for the 
maximum allowed data payload 114 bytes. Similarly, the maximum effective capacity for 
other data payloads, 16 bytes, 32 bytes and 48 bytes is equal to 60.6 kbps, 97.56 kbps and 
122.44 kbps, respectively. 
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𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 + 𝑇𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝑇𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡                                                    ( ) 
𝐶𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ≤
𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 + 𝑇𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝑇𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙                     (2) 
Moreover, due to the collision avoidance mechanism, the effective capacity of a wireless 
link decreases when there is more than one node within its collision domain. For example, 
when N active nodes, belonging to the same path, are within each other’s transmission 
range, the maximum effective rate on that path is 
𝐶
(𝑁 − 1)
 since only one of the N nodes can 
transmit at any time. In our simulation, the network topology is a square grid, and the 
number of nodes is 25.  
In our experiments, we applied different publishing rate of the messages with a different 
number of publishers. The publishing rates are: 0.25, 0.5,1 ,2, 4, and 8 messages per second. 
The size of the payload of the messages is 16 bytes in addition to the 14 bytes of the packet 
header and CRC. Table 21 shows the capacity of each publishing rate. For example, to 
calculate the data rate of payload 16 bytes publishing rate is 4 msg/s, and the overhead 
bytes are 14 is equal to (16+14) * 4 (messages) * 8 (number of bits) = 960 bps. 
To show why there are drop-in packets even when we applied the simulation parameter to 
get a perfect delivery ratio for only one publisher. Taking the worst case, when the network 






Table 21: The corresponding date rate of the published messages. 
Publishing rate 
(msg/s) 









An example to show the effect of the messages drops when we have a publishing rate of 8 
msgs/s.  Refer to discussion in the previous section for the one broker implementation. For 
the case of four Publisher, section 6.1 Table 18 shows node 12 is included 2 times, and 
node 6 is included 4 times, for the routing paths of the four Publishers. At node 12, the 
node is a Publisher and at the same time is A relay node at the path for Publisher 24, through 
the node 18. Therefore, node 12 is Publishing at the rate of 8 msg/s, and as a relay it receives 
and forwards the messages from node 18 whenever they arrive and ready (processing time) 
to be sent to node 6 throughout the simulation time. At node 6, it is included four times in 
the routing paths, twice from node 12, one time from node 7 and 11; then it forwards the 
messages to the base station. Therefore, we have 3 Nodes are forwarding packets to Node 
6. Due to the collision avoidance mechanism, the effective capacity of the wireless link 
decreases when there is more than one node within its collision domain. Therefore, if we 
take the worst-case node, it would be node 6, but not all the node in the network are in the 
collision domain. Therefore, we considered the direct neighbors and the next direct 
neighbors. The total number of node are 15. 
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4328.57 bps for each node. From Table 21, the capacity of the traffic for the 16 bytes packet 
payload is 1920 for each publisher. Therefore, the sum of capacity arriving to node 6 from 
4 publishers is 4* 1920 = 7680 bps. As a result, we can see that the incoming packets speed 
is faster the capacity of the node to receive all the packets. The simulation results show the 
total PDR of the network is around 0.79. Most of the dropped packets are at the nodes 6. 
The PDR is not the same for all publishers. Our results showed in this example that the 
PDR of node 24 is 0.93, the PDR of node 20 is 0.87, the PDR of the node is 0.75, and 
finally, the PDR of node 4 is 0.59. 
Similarly, when applying the calculation for the same case 4 publishers on the slower 
publishing rate, such as 4 msgs/s. From Table 21, the capacity of the traffic for the 16 bytes 
packet payload is 960 bps for each publisher. Therefore, the sum of capacity arriving at 
node 6 from 4 publishers is 4* 960 = 3840 bps, which is less than the maximum effective 
capacity. Our results show that the PDR, in this case, is 0.99975. 
 
6.3.2 A mathematical model of radio energy consumption approximation 
On this part, an approximation of the radio energy consumption to compare it with the 
simulation results in different cases of the number of Publishers in the network. In our 
experiments, the energy consumption is calculated by taking the summation of the energy 
consumption of all nodes in the network in milli-Joule (𝑚𝐽) unit. The energy consumption 
equation is calculated using equation (3). The energy consumption depends on the state 
(Transmit, Receive, Idle, sleep) of the radio for the nodes. The sleep mode is when the 
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node is idle for a long time without any activity. Table 22, shows the values of the mode 
(state) of the radio 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑜_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  consumption, which are obtained from the datasheet 
of the MicaZ motes. 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑜_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  represents the state duration the sensor spends, 
and 𝑉 represents the constant voltage, which equal to 3 Volts. 
Table 22: Radio current consumption of MicaZ 
MicaZ 
Mode Current 
Receive 19.7 mA 
Transmit 17.4 mA 
Idle 20 µA 
Sleep 1 µA 
 
 𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∑ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑜_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝑉𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 ∗ 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑜_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑛
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
                   (3) 
In our simulation, we used the size of the message in addition to the overhead as explained, 
is equal to 30 bytes. Also, the duration of transmitting 1 Byte is 32 µs. Therefore, the 
duration of time to send one message in our experiments is equal to 3 𝐵 ∗ 32µ𝑠 =  .96𝑚𝑠. 
We will assume in the calculations that PDR is perfect. Therefore, our calculations 
represent the upper bound of the energy consumption. For different publishing rates, the 
number of messages varies accordingly. In the 1 Publisher case, where the publishing rate 
is 1 msg/s, the number of messages sent publisher node ID_24 is 500 messages. The 
messages will follow the routing path as explained on section 6.1 Table 16. Also, section 
6.2 Table 20 provides the number of nodes that are involved according to the number of 
the publishers’ case, and how many times the messages are transmitted and received during 
the routing path. Thus, for the case of 1 Publisher, node 24 transmits 500, and the nodes in 
between (18-12-6) receive and transmit (forward) the messages to node 0, so the number 
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of states in transmit mode are 4 as well as the receive states, which the sum of all values in 
Table 20. We can apply the results on equation (3). The variable 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑜_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 , is 
the number of messages (500) multiply the sum of states (4) taken from Table 20, and then 
multiply time duration of 1 message ( .96𝑚𝑠). Directly we can apply the transmitting state 
and receiving state in equation (3). When the sending is done, the node goes to the idle 
mode. Therefore, the total 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑙𝑒 is calculated as the total simulation time minus 
the total duration time in the transmitting and receiving state. For the sleeping state, the 
nodes that are not involved at any activity (publishing, subscribing or relay) is considered 
in the sleep state. Which is the number of zeros in the Table 20. Thus, the 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑙𝑒  is 
the entire simulation time (500 seconds). The number of nodes at sleeping mode for 
example in the case of 1 publishers is 20 nodes, (case of 2 publishers is 17 nodes), and the 
number of nodes at the case of the full publisher is 0. The total energy is calculated by 
taking the summation of each state. Figure 37 shows the comparison between the 






Figure 37: Radio consumption, simulation vs analytical results 
 
6.4 Space (Memory) complexity 
Space complexity is a measure of the amount of the total space is used by the algorithm to 
complete the execution concerning the input size. It is calculated for how much memory is 
needed in the worst case at any point in the algorithm. The concern is with how the space 
needs grow, in big-Oh terms, as the size N of the input problem grows. The space 
complexity is divided into constant space and auxiliary space. The constant space is the 
one which is fixed for the algorithm, generally equals to the space used by the input and 
the local variables. Whereas, the auxiliary space, is the temporary space used by the 
algorithm during the execution. Usually, the constant memory is ignored and only focus 
























1p 2p 4p 8p 16 24
Simulation 236.1062 434.1966 731.2997 1308.329 2380.518 3621.591
Analytical 273.6346 482.6616 798.5059 1432.876 2602.64 3978.972
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Regardless of the architecture of the machine, the space complexity of a variable is 
considered to be equal to one memory unit. Therefore, the space complexity required for 
an array variable is equal to the size of the array.  
6.4.1 Multilinear Modular Hashing (MMH) algorithm 
General properties of the MMH algorithm is that the memory unit considered is of size 
32bits. Also, the prime integer used is  𝑝 =  232 +  5,  which is the least of formula 
suggested in the theory by Carter and Wegman, to implement a division-less modular 
reduction. It can be in the range of [232 ; 232+ 216]. It is used to implement the division-
less modular reduction. The output of the function is a 32-bit integer. 
A vector of different 32-bit numbers used to implement the so-called inner-product 
operation. A good choice is to take only prime numbers. The number of elements of such 
a vector must be at least equal to the key length divided by 4. The reduction operation is to 
perform the modulus of the prime number. The pseudocode of the MMH algorithm is as 
follows: 
MMH(𝑚𝑠𝑔 𝑘𝑒𝑦 𝑛) 
𝑆𝑢𝑚𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ = 𝑆𝑢𝑚𝐿𝑜𝑤 = 0 
For 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛 
       load 𝑚𝑠𝑔[𝑖] 
       load 𝑘𝑒𝑦[𝑖] 
       (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑤 =  𝑚𝑠𝑔[𝑖]  ∗  𝑘𝑒𝑦[𝑖] 
        𝑆𝑢𝑚𝐿𝑜𝑤 =  𝑆𝑢𝑚𝐿𝑜𝑤 +  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑤 
        𝑆𝑢𝑚𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ =  𝑆𝑢𝑚𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ +  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ +  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦 






The space complexity of the algorithm is as follows: 
The variable 𝑚𝑠𝑔 and 𝑘𝑒𝑦 are arrays of size 𝑛. All the individual variables are of size 32 
bits (4 Bytes). The constant complexity: 𝑛 Bytes+ 𝑛 Bytes+ 4 Bytes (variable 𝑛) + 8 Bytes 
(2 variables, SumHigh and Sumlow). Therefore, the total in bytes is (2 𝑛 + 12) Bytes. In 
big-Oh terms, it is equal to 𝑂(𝑛). The auxiliary complexity: we have 3 temporary variables, 
that are reused in the loop. Therefore, the total is 12 Bytes. In big-Oh terms is equal to 
𝑂( ). The total space complexity = Constant space + Auxiliary space= (2𝑛+12) +12= 
2𝑛+24. 
Table 23 shows the required data needed when we change the input size to the algorithm 
implementation. We examined two sensor platforms, MicaZ and TelosB. Figure 38 shows 
linear trending of the results taken from Table 23, which is similar to the memory 
complexity analysis above. The RAM results are matching the analysis. 
Table 23: MMH Algorithm implementation results on sensor memory. 
 
Bytes RAM ROM RAM ROM
16 36 2074 38 302
32 68 2106 66 334
48 100 2138 102 366
64 132 2170 134 398
80 164 2202 166 430
96 196 2234 198 462
112 228 2266 230 494
128 260 2298 262 526





Figure 38: MMH Input memory vs the required memory complexity 
6.4.2 Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) 
The algorithm takes an input of any size and produces a 160-bit (20-byte) hash value. The 
pseudocode of the SHA-1 algorithm is as follows: 
SHA-1(𝑚𝑠𝑔 𝑛) 
h0 = 0x67452301; h1 = 0xEFCDAB89; h2 = 0x98BADCFE; h3 = 0x10325476; h4 = 0xC3D2E1F0 
ml = message length in bits 
for each chunk (512 bits size) 
    break chunk into sixteen 32-bit big-endian words w[i], 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 
    Extend the sixteen 32-bit words into eighty 32-bit words: 
    for i from 16 to 79 
        w[i] = (w[i-3] xor w[i-8] xor w[i-14] xor w[i-16]) leftrotate 1 
 
    Initialize hash value for this chunk:  
    a = h0;    b = h1;     c = h2;     d = h3;    e = h4; 
 
    Main loop:  
    for i from 0 to 79 
        if 0 ≤ i ≤ 19 then 
            f = (b and c) or ((not b) and d) 
            k = 0x5A827999 
        else if 20 ≤ i ≤ 39 
            f = b xor c xor d 
            k = 0x6ED9EBA1 
        else if 40 ≤ i ≤ 59 
            f = (b and c) or (b and d) or (c and d)  
y = 2x + 4
R² = 1


































            k = 0x8F1BBCDC 
        else if 60 ≤ i ≤ 79 
            f = b xor c xor d 
            k = 0xCA62C1D6 
 
        temp = (a leftrotate 5) + f + e + k + w[i] 
        e = d;   d = c;        c = b leftrotate 30;         b = a;         a = temp; 
 
    h0 = h0 + a;   h1 = h1 + b;     h2 = h2 + c;     h3 = h3 + d;    h4 = h4 + e; 
 
hh = (h0 leftshift 128) or (h1 leftshift 96) or (h2 leftshift 64) or (h3 leftshift 32) or h4 // The hash 
result in hh 
 
The space complexity analysis for the SHA-1 algorithm is as follows: The variable 𝑚𝑠𝑔 is 
an array of size 𝑛. All variables of size 32 bits (4 Bytes), except 𝑚𝑙 of size 64 bits (8 Bytes 
units) and ℎℎ of size 160 bits (20 Bytes). The constant complexity: 𝑛 Bytes (for the 𝑚𝑠𝑔 
array) + 4 Bytes (for variable 𝑛) + 28 Bytes (for the initial variables, 5 of size 4B memory 
units (variables ℎ − ℎ4) and 1 of size 8B (variable 𝑚𝑙)+ 20 Bytes (for variable ℎℎ)). 
Therefore, the total in bytes is (𝑛+52) Bytes. In big-Oh terms, it is equal to 𝑂(𝑛). The 
auxiliary complexity: we have some temporary variables: Array variable 𝑤 of size 320 
Bytes, 80 entries of size 4 Bytes each. Also, 9 variables and their total size is 36 Bytes 
((𝑎 − 𝑒) 𝑖  𝑓  𝑘  𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝). Therefore, the total is 356 Bytes (320+36). In big-Oh terms is 
equal to 𝑂( ). The total space complexity = Constant space + Auxiliary space= (𝑛 +52) 
+356= 𝑛 +408. 
For both algorithms, there is a direct relation with RAM. The difference from the ROM is 
the constant value in the equation. The contribution is from the source code, and the size 
of constants values and the defined variables. Increasing the size array will increase the 
memory size. Figure 39 shows linear trending of the results taken from Table 24, which is 
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similar to the memory complexity analysis above. The RAM results are matching the 
analysis. 
Table 24: SHA1 Algorithm implementation results on sensor memory. 
 
 
Figure 39: SHA1 Input memory vs the required memory complexity 
6.5 Packet loss analysis 
This section introduces the problem of the individual readings of the nodes, especially the 
nodes with symmetric paths to the base station. All reported readings for the performance 
metrics have been collected for the entire nodes in the network, without taking the 
Bytes RAM ROM RAM ROM
16 397 2126 398 1896
32 413 2142 414 1912
48 429 2158 430 1928
64 445 2174 446 1944
80 461 2190 462 1960
96 477 2206 478 1976
112 493 2222 494 1992
128 509 2238 510 2008




individual readings of the nodes. However, we tracked the reading of the individual reading 
of the nodes as well. We noticed that there are some nodes with symmetric path to the base 
station have differences in the packet delivery ratio readings with a noticeable reading 
difference as nearly 30%. The symmetric path means that the targeted nodes have a similar 
number of hops and distances to the base station. Therefore, it is expected that they have 
similar reading and not necessarily identical values.  Section 6.1 Table 14 shows 
parameters to specify the topology of our network to generate the values for the nodes in 
the first column, and a description of the parameters, in the second columns. It is an 
example of the values from which the simulator generates the gain values for the network. 
Several files for the nodes gain are generated, to ensure randomness with the readings. 
Although some nodes are in the symmetric path to the base station, their corresponding 
gain values are not identical. 
Table 25 shows the average values of 15 files gain readings and provide the cross-table 
readings of the nodes in the network. It shows the gain between the nodes. The colored 
squares in the table to show the value of the symmetric nodes 4 and node 20 matched hops. 
The matched color shows corresponding value in the path of the nodes toward the base-
station. For example, the first hope node of the nodes 4 and 20 is 8 and 16, respectively. 
The gain value for the node pairs 4:8 and 20:16 is (-17.15) dBm and (-16.5487) dBm, 
respectively. Similarly, we can track the rest of the path to the base-station. We followed 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.5.1 Results and Analysis 
In this subsection, we focus on the case where we got inconsistent results regarding the 
symmetric nodes, and to investigate if other factors can control the misbehavior of the 
values in the initial results. The focus in the following study is on the example of symmetric 
nodes 4 and 20 as stated in the introduction of section 6.5. The path of node 4 is 8-7-6-0 
with a number of hops equal to 4. The path for node 20 is16-11-6-0 with number of hops 
equal to 4. We increased the message rate for the publisher node to make the messages 
drop obvious when we have only two nodes are publishing in the network. We have a 
message rate of 16 messages per second (msg/s) and 32 msg/s. We reduced the simulation 
time to 100 seconds instead of 500 seconds to get the results faster. The total number of 
messages that are sent by each publisher is equal to 1600 messages and 3200 messages for 
message rates of 16 msg/s and 32 msg/s, respectively. Table 26 shows the detail results of 
the experiment where the message rate is 16 msg/s for two publishers, node 4 and node 20. 
Similarly, Table 27 Table 26 shows the detail results of the experiment where the message 
rate is 32 msg/s. As stated in the introduction, node 6 is the broker node, where the 
messages are collected from the network nodes then passed to the base-station. 
Table 26: Detail table for Publishing rate 16 msg/s 
 
Readings N4-N20 N4-N20 PDR N4 PDR N20 PDR N4 PDR N20
# Sent Received Sent Rec @ BS Rec @ BS Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 PDR @ 6 PDR @ 6
1 1600 1063 1597 1308 -245 1511 1511 1432 1432 79 0.664375 0.819036 0.944375 0.896681
2 1600 1086 1597 1311 -225 1518 1518 1450 1450 68 0.67875 0.820914 0.94875 0.907952
3 1600 1090 1597 1285 -195 1496 1496 1443 1443 53 0.68125 0.804634 0.935 0.903569
4 1600 1128 1597 1295 -167 1524 1524 1433 1433 91 0.705 0.810895 0.9525 0.897307
5 1600 1081 1597 1335 -254 1525 1525 1459 1459 66 0.675625 0.835942 0.953125 0.913588
6 1600 1087 1597 1331 -244 1510 1510 1461 1461 49 0.679375 0.833438 0.94375 0.91484
7 1600 1092 1597 1299 -207 1506 1506 1451 1451 55 0.6825 0.8134 0.94125 0.908579
8 1600 1073 1597 1302 -229 1515 1515 1467 1467 48 0.670625 0.815279 0.946875 0.918597
9 1600 1080 1597 1332 -252 1503 1503 1459 1459 44 0.675 0.834064 0.939375 0.913588
10 1600 1101 1597 1311 -210 1494 1494 1462 1462 32 0.688125 0.820914 0.93375 0.915466
11 1600 1096 1597 1315 -219 1505 1505 1455 1455 50 0.685 0.823419 0.940625 0.911083
12 1600 1062 1597 1316 -254 1493 1493 1439 1439 54 0.66375 0.824045 0.933125 0.901064
13 1600 1105 1597 1313 -208 1506 1506 1431 1431 75 0.690625 0.822167 0.94125 0.896055
14 1600 1087 1597 1315 -228 1495 1495 1450 1450 45 0.679375 0.823419 0.934375 0.907952
15 1600 1085 1597 1318 -233 1491 1491 1452 1452 39 0.678125 0.825297 0.931875 0.909205
Average 1600 1087.733 1597 1312.4 -224.667 1506.133 1506.133 1449.6 1449.6 56.53333 0.679833 0.821791 0.941333 0.907702
Node 20 Node 4 Node 20Node 4
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Table 27: Detail table for Publishing rate 32 msg/s 
 
The table shows 15 readings corresponding to the 15 gain files for the simulator as 
explained in section 6.1. Each row in the table provides the number of the messages sent 
and received for the publishers at the base-station, and the broker node. Also, it shows the 
corresponding packet delivery ratio (PDR) at the broker and the base-station. There are two 
columns (N4-N20) where we provide the difference in the message received at the base-
station and broker between the publisher 4 and publisher 20. The number of messages 
received from publisher 20 is subtracted from the messages received from publisher 4 at 
broker and base-station. We notice that the values in the difference-column regarding the 
base-station are always in a negative sign. The negative sign in the column indicates that 
the messages received from node 20 are more than the messages received from node 4. 
This the reason we made the study to investigate this behavior, assuming that the simulator 
favors specific nodes although they are symmetric, and the randomness is provided through 
the gain files. The sign in the difference column may indicate the correctness of the results 
regarding fairness and randomness if the sign is changed alternately for a given number of 
readings (rows in the table). 
Readings N4-N20 N4-N20 PDR N4 PDR N20 PDR N4 PDR N20
# Sent Received Sent Rec @ BS Rec @ BS Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 PDR @ 6 PDR @ 6
1 3200 2083 3194 2521 -438 2937 2937 2856 2856 81 0.650938 0.789292 0.917813 0.894177
2 3200 2144 3194 2508 -364 2946 2946 2868 2868 78 0.67 0.785222 0.920625 0.897934
3 3200 2132 3194 2549 -417 2948 2948 2868 2868 80 0.66625 0.798059 0.92125 0.897934
4 3200 2109 3194 2521 -412 2957 2957 2863 2863 94 0.659063 0.789292 0.924063 0.896368
5 3200 2147 3194 2557 -410 2977 2977 2907 2907 70 0.670938 0.800564 0.930313 0.910144
6 3200 2160 3194 2562 -402 2966 2966 2913 2913 53 0.675 0.802129 0.926875 0.912023
7 3200 2098 3194 2560 -462 2935 2935 2903 2903 32 0.655625 0.801503 0.917188 0.908892
8 3200 2134 3194 2563 -429 2944 2944 2882 2882 62 0.666875 0.802442 0.92 0.902317
9 3200 2109 3194 2560 -451 2935 2935 2889 2889 46 0.659063 0.801503 0.917188 0.904508
10 3200 2109 3194 2539 -430 2928 2928 2896 2896 32 0.659063 0.794928 0.915 0.9067
11 3200 2115 3194 2521 -406 2964 2964 2883 2883 81 0.660938 0.789292 0.92625 0.90263
12 3200 2131 3194 2530 -399 2963 2963 2881 2881 82 0.665938 0.79211 0.925938 0.902004
13 3200 2085 3194 2521 -436 2938 2938 2877 2877 61 0.651563 0.789292 0.918125 0.900751
14 3200 2084 3194 2587 -503 2949 2949 2890 2890 59 0.65125 0.809956 0.921563 0.904822
15 3200 2138 3194 2516 -378 2968 2968 2880 2880 88 0.668125 0.787727 0.9275 0.901691
Average 3200 2118.533 3194 2541 -422.467 2950.333 2950.333 2883.733 2883.733 66.6 0.662042 0.795554 0.921979 0.90286
Node 4 Node 20Node 4 Node 20
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The observations that we can extract from table 4 that the number of messages received 
from publisher 20 is more than the messages received from publisher 4 which results in the 
PDR of publisher 20 is more than PDR of publisher 4 at the base-station. The difference in 
the PDR is significant (nearly 14%) although both nodes published the same number of 
nodes in favor of node 20. Also, the difference in the PDR is less at the broker (nearly 
3.4%) in favor of node 4. Similar observations are concluded when we increase the 
message rate to 32 msg/s, but the difference in the PDR is slightly less, nearly 13% at base-
station and nearly 2% at the broker. 
At this point, we have a node (Publisher 20) that suffers less from message drop than the 
other node (Publisher 4). It was assumed that the problem was due to the difference in the 
gain path through the base-station. However, after providing more gain files, the average 
value of the gain files shows only a slight difference in the overall value when we compare 
the two publishers’ paths. In [94], the author added a mechanism to minimize the effect of 
co-channel interference. The mechanism is simply set different spacing time between the 
nodes when they started publishing and called it interference-free-scheduling (IFS) 
algorithm. The author made a study to compare the results after adding this algorithm, 
which showed PDR improved by nearly 3.5 times for the studied scenarios in their work. 
 In our example, the IFS algorithm is applied by making the Publisher 20 to start sending 
data after 200 ms from Publisher 4. To check for the symmetry comparison between the 
publishers, we need to put them on the same conditions. Thus, they should start all at the 
same time, and cancel the job of IFS algorithm. We verified the observation by swapping 
the conditions and made Publisher 4 to start 200 ms after Publisher 20. All the results are 
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interchanged as provided in Table 28 for the message rate of 16 ms/s. Similarly, the same 
observations are provided in Table 29 for the message rate of 32 msg/s.  
Table 28: Detail table for Publishing rate 16 msg/s (swap conditions) 
 
Table 29: Detail table for Publishing rate 32 msg/s (swap conditions). 
 
The next step to study the symmetric publishers, we started all publishers at the same time, 
canceling the job of IFS algorithm. The results are provided in Table 30. It is clear from 
the table that the PDR values are almost the same. We can notice the sign of the difference 
column, which the sigh is alternating. Meaning that there is no favoring the messages 
received from specific publishers as it was assumed at the beginning. Furthermore, the total 
number of messages received at the base-station is less than the total number of the 
Readings N4-N20 N4-N20 PDR N4 PDR N20 PDR N4 PDR N20
# Sent Received Sent Rec @ BS Rec @ BS Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 PDR @ 6 PDR @ 6
1 1597 1302 1600 1094 208 1448 1448 1492 1492 -44 0.815279 0.68375 0.9067 0.9325
2 1597 1325 1600 1091 234 1460 1460 1507 1507 -47 0.829681 0.681875 0.914214 0.941875
3 1597 1314 1600 1063 251 1452 1452 1495 1495 -43 0.822793 0.664375 0.909205 0.934375
4 1597 1326 1600 1095 231 1460 1460 1516 1516 -56 0.830307 0.684375 0.914214 0.9475
5 1597 1318 1600 1075 243 1447 1447 1501 1501 -54 0.825297 0.671875 0.906074 0.938125
6 1597 1299 1600 1088 211 1442 1442 1511 1511 -69 0.8134 0.68 0.902943 0.944375
7 1597 1309 1600 1077 232 1451 1451 1483 1483 -32 0.819662 0.673125 0.908579 0.926875
8 1597 1295 1600 1063 232 1455 1455 1498 1498 -43 0.810895 0.664375 0.911083 0.93625
9 1597 1275 1600 1143 132 1424 1424 1512 1512 -88 0.798372 0.714375 0.891672 0.945
10 1597 1320 1600 1088 232 1448 1448 1522 1522 -74 0.82655 0.68 0.9067 0.95125
11 1597 1296 1600 1103 193 1435 1435 1517 1517 -82 0.811522 0.689375 0.89856 0.948125
12 1597 1289 1600 1118 171 1438 1438 1510 1510 -72 0.807138 0.69875 0.900438 0.94375
13 1597 1303 1600 1051 252 1442 1442 1483 1483 -41 0.815905 0.656875 0.902943 0.926875
14 1597 1297 1600 1097 200 1441 1441 1493 1493 -52 0.812148 0.685625 0.902317 0.933125
15 1597 1287 1600 1071 216 1449 1449 1497 1497 -48 0.805886 0.669375 0.907326 0.935625
Average 1597 1303.667 1600 1087.8 215.8667 1446.133 1446.133 1502.467 1502.467 -56.3333 0.816322 0.679875 0.905531 0.939042
Node 4 Node 20 Node 4 Node 20
Readings N4-N20 N4-N20 PDR N4 PDR N20 PDR N4 PDR N20
# Sent Received Sent Rec @ BS Rec @ BS Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 PDR @ 6 PDR @ 6
1 3194 2557 3200 2078 479 2887 2887 2934 2934 -47 0.800564 0.649375 0.903882 0.916875
2 3194 2533 3200 2107 426 2859 2859 2919 2919 -60 0.793049 0.658438 0.895116 0.912188
3 3194 2528 3200 2107 421 2886 2886 2961 2961 -75 0.791484 0.658438 0.903569 0.925313
4 3194 2528 3200 2112 416 2873 2873 2925 2925 -52 0.791484 0.66 0.899499 0.914063
5 3194 2497 3200 2137 360 2876 2876 2951 2951 -75 0.781778 0.667813 0.900438 0.922188
6 3194 2547 3200 2160 387 2895 2895 2940 2940 -45 0.797433 0.675 0.906387 0.91875
7 3194 2541 3200 2100 441 2867 2867 2941 2941 -74 0.795554 0.65625 0.897621 0.919063
8 3194 2560 3200 2121 439 2896 2896 2931 2931 -35 0.801503 0.662813 0.9067 0.915938
9 3194 2535 3200 2147 388 2878 2878 2961 2961 -83 0.793676 0.670938 0.901064 0.925313
10 3194 2511 3200 2129 382 2860 2860 2959 2959 -99 0.786162 0.665313 0.895429 0.924688
11 3194 2539 3200 2140 399 2874 2874 2965 2965 -91 0.794928 0.66875 0.899812 0.926563
12 3194 2532 3200 2121 411 2895 2895 2933 2933 -38 0.792736 0.662813 0.906387 0.916563
13 3194 2536 3200 2096 440 2879 2879 2939 2939 -60 0.793989 0.655 0.901378 0.918438
14 3194 2544 3200 2090 454 2890 2890 2942 2942 -52 0.796493 0.653125 0.904822 0.919375
15 3194 2569 3200 2127 442 2890 2890 2943 2943 -53 0.804321 0.664688 0.904822 0.919688
Average 3194 2537.133 3200 2118.133 419 2880.333 2880.333 2942.933 2942.933 -62.6 0.794344 0.661917 0.901795 0.919667
Node 4 Node 20 Node 4 Node 20
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messages received when the IFS algorithm is presented. Similarly, the same observations 
are provided in Table 31 for the message rate of 32 msg/s. 
Table 30: Detail table for Publishing rate 16 msg/s (same conditions) 
 
Table 31: Detail table for Publishing rate 32 msg/s (same conditions). 
 
To test for more publishers, we increased the number of publishers to be 4 and made the 
same experiment setups. We kept the publishers 4 and 20 as a symmetric pair in addition 
to publishers 12 and 24 as depicted in our network topology. Following the same analysis 
of the tables, we can see from Table 31 that the PDR of the symmetric nodes is close. The 
PDR of publisher 4 is 0.489, and the PDR of publisher 20 is 0.483. The PDR of the other 
publishers is different, for publisher 12 is 0.579, and publisher 24 is 0.459 which is less, 
Readings N4-N20 N4-N20 PDR N4 PDR N20 PDR N4 PDR N20
# Sent Received Sent Rec @ BS Rec @ BS Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 PDR @ 6 PDR @ 6
1 1600 1021 1600 1060 -39 1430 1430 1464 1464 -34 0.638125 0.6625 0.89375 0.915
2 1600 1045 1600 1036 9 1456 1456 1454 1454 2 0.653125 0.6475 0.91 0.90875
3 1600 1039 1600 1038 1 1446 1446 1431 1431 15 0.649375 0.64875 0.90375 0.894375
4 1600 1043 1600 1071 -28 1442 1442 1440 1440 2 0.651875 0.669375 0.90125 0.9
5 1600 1038 1600 1047 -9 1447 1447 1446 1446 1 0.64875 0.654375 0.904375 0.90375
6 1600 1047 1600 1038 9 1432 1432 1425 1425 7 0.654375 0.64875 0.895 0.890625
7 1600 1043 1600 1039 4 1436 1436 1432 1432 4 0.651875 0.649375 0.8975 0.895
8 1600 1059 1600 1018 41 1436 1436 1442 1442 -6 0.661875 0.63625 0.8975 0.90125
9 1600 1025 1600 1025 0 1452 1452 1439 1439 13 0.640625 0.640625 0.9075 0.899375
10 1600 1057 1600 1043 14 1434 1434 1433 1433 1 0.660625 0.651875 0.89625 0.895625
11 1600 1061 1600 1028 33 1437 1437 1431 1431 6 0.663125 0.6425 0.898125 0.894375
12 1600 1038 1600 1063 -25 1410 1410 1438 1438 -28 0.64875 0.664375 0.88125 0.89875
13 1600 1043 1600 1043 0 1437 1437 1453 1453 -16 0.651875 0.651875 0.898125 0.908125
14 1600 1031 1600 1052 -21 1437 1437 1457 1457 -20 0.644375 0.6575 0.898125 0.910625
15 1600 1044 1600 1052 -8 1445 1445 1439 1439 6 0.6525 0.6575 0.903125 0.899375
Average 1600 1042.267 1600 1043.533 -1.26667 1438.467 1438.467 1441.6 1441.6 -3.13333 0.651417 0.652208 0.899042 0.901
Node 4 Node 20 Node 4 Node 20
Readings N4-N20 N4-N20 PDR N4 PDR N20 PDR N4 PDR N20
# Sent Received Sent Rec @ BS Rec @ BS Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 Snt  6 Rec @ 6 PDR @ 6 PDR @ 6
1 3200 2078 3200 2030 48 2875 2875 2816 2816 59 0.649375 0.634375 0.898438 0.88
2 3200 2052 3200 2079 -27 2879 2879 2878 2878 1 0.64125 0.649688 0.899688 0.899375
3 3200 2124 3200 2069 55 2885 2885 2870 2870 15 0.66375 0.646563 0.901563 0.896875
4 3200 2052 3200 2035 17 2868 2868 2870 2870 -2 0.64125 0.635938 0.89625 0.896875
5 3200 2062 3200 2088 -26 2871 2871 2859 2859 12 0.644375 0.6525 0.897188 0.893438
6 3200 2077 3200 2015 62 2878 2878 2866 2866 12 0.649063 0.629688 0.899375 0.895625
7 3200 2051 3200 2107 -56 2894 2894 2857 2857 37 0.640938 0.658438 0.904375 0.892813
8 3200 2088 3200 2025 63 2877 2877 2832 2832 45 0.6525 0.632813 0.899063 0.885
9 3200 2057 3200 2090 -33 2864 2864 2891 2891 -27 0.642813 0.653125 0.895 0.903438
10 3200 2051 3200 2017 34 2858 2858 2866 2866 -8 0.640938 0.630313 0.893125 0.895625
11 3200 2105 3200 2118 -13 2874 2874 2874 2874 0 0.657813 0.661875 0.898125 0.898125
12 3200 2082 3200 2043 39 2841 2841 2844 2844 -3 0.650625 0.638438 0.887813 0.88875
13 3200 2046 3200 2073 -27 2860 2860 2872 2872 -12 0.639375 0.647813 0.89375 0.8975
14 3200 2081 3200 2109 -28 2859 2859 2874 2874 -15 0.650313 0.659063 0.893438 0.898125
15 3200 2086 3200 2049 37 2893 2893 2847 2847 46 0.651875 0.640313 0.904063 0.889688
Average 3200 2072.8 3200 2063.133 9.666667 2871.733 2871.733 2861.067 2861.067 10.66667 0.64775 0.644729 0.897417 0.894083
Node 20 Node 4 Node 20Node 4
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due to the routing path of node 24 has more hops than node 12. As stated before, having 
more hops results in suffering from more dropping of messages along the path. The same 
observations are presented for a message rate of 32 msg/s. We added a graph to show the 
frequency of the messages that are successfully arrived at the broker node, for 20 seconds 
intervals for the entire simulation. Figure 40 shows the frequency of the four publishers. 
We can see that for the symmetric pair we focus on, the publishers 4 and 20 have close 
values. 
 
Figure 40: Message frequency received at node 6 for message rate 32 msg/s. 
 
Extended results for nodes (4,20),(14,22) 
In this part, we extended the PDR analysis to account for scenarios where the nodes start 
exactly at the same time instead of applying IFS algorithm. We found that the symmetric 
nodes are similar in the PDR value, unlike when we used the IFS algorithm. However, the 
overall PDR is better when we apply IFS. Table 41 shows the PDR values for the individual 
nodes at the base-station and the broker node. On each experiment, we also calculated the 

















































1024-21503 21504-41983 41984-62463 62464-82943 82944-103423
Message Frequency recieved at Node 6
4 12 20 24
123 
 
at the base-station node in order to show the randomness and the differences in each 
experiment, as the number of received messages is not fixed. 
Figure 41: Four publishers (4,20,14,22) with message rate16 msg/s (all same time). 
 
For the next part, we applied a Poisson distribution for the data rate and maintained the 
same overall average data rates. We investigated changing the time the symmetric nodes 
start publishing data. The values of the PDR of the symmetric nodes are almost the same, 
unlike when we apply the IFS algorithm. Also, the overall PDR is improved. Table 32, 
shows the results the nodes publish data at the same, PDR is close for all publishers and 
better than previous results without Poisson message rate. However, N14-N22 is always 






Readings PDR N4 PDR N14 PDR N20 PDR N22 N4-N20 N14-N22
# Sent Rec @ BS Sent Rec @ BS Sent Rec @ BS Sent Rec @ BS Rec @ BS Rec @ BS
1 1600 531 1600 574 1600 523 1600 531 0.331875 0.35875 0.326875 0.331875 8 43
2 1600 555 1600 529 1600 544 1600 529 0.346875 0.330625 0.34 0.330625 11 0
3 1600 538 1600 534 1600 496 1600 572 0.33625 0.33375 0.31 0.3575 42 -38
4 1600 524 1600 532 1600 573 1600 543 0.3275 0.3325 0.358125 0.339375 -49 -11
5 1600 529 1600 541 1600 481 1600 544 0.330625 0.338125 0.300625 0.34 48 -3
6 1600 521 1600 530 1600 555 1600 535 0.325625 0.33125 0.346875 0.334375 -34 -5
7 1600 533 1600 564 1600 572 1600 510 0.333125 0.3525 0.3575 0.31875 -39 54
8 1600 536 1600 542 1600 539 1600 531 0.335 0.33875 0.336875 0.331875 -3 11
9 1600 517 1600 564 1600 511 1600 513 0.323125 0.3525 0.319375 0.320625 6 51
10 1600 523 1600 525 1600 574 1600 520 0.326875 0.328125 0.35875 0.325 -51 5
11 1600 529 1600 543 1600 478 1600 548 0.330625 0.339375 0.29875 0.3425 51 -5
12 1600 567 1600 544 1600 537 1600 525 0.354375 0.34 0.335625 0.328125 30 19
13 1600 559 1600 541 1600 533 1600 540 0.349375 0.338125 0.333125 0.3375 26 1
14 1600 521 1600 528 1600 560 1600 484 0.325625 0.33 0.35 0.3025 -39 44
15 1600 560 1600 534 1600 554 1600 520 0.35 0.33375 0.34625 0.325 6 14
Average 1600 536.2 1600 541.6667 1600 535.3333 1600 529.6667 0.335125 0.338542 0.334583 0.331042 -4.7 18.9
Node 4 14 Node 20 22
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Table 32: Four publishers with Poisson message rate16 msg/s (same time) 
 
We repeated the experiments for different average data rate using Poisson message rate for 
the same performance metrics observed in Chapter 5. We conducted additional simulation 
runs where we change the average data rate from 0.25 to 8 msg/s to study the effect of the 
traffic density in the network for all versions of the middleware. As shown in Figure 42, 
the results regarding MCU are almost identical for all versions of the middleware as we 
stated earlier. Also, for the readings of each middleware version, there is a slight increment 
in the energy consumption for MCU while we are changing the data rate from 0.25 to 8 
msg/s. For the Radio energy consumption part, the effect of applying different data rates is 
evident following the same trend for all middleware versions. In every data rate option, 
TDDS_AES_MMH consume less energy than TDDS_AES_SHA1. 
Readings PDR N4 PDR N14 PDR N20 PDR N22 N4-N20 N14-N22
# Sent Rec @ BS Sent Rec @ BS Sent Rec @ BS Sent Rec @ BS Rec @ BS Rec @ BS
1 1517 943 1430 892 1459 948 1632 1064 0.621622 0.623776 0.64976 0.651961 -5 -172
2 1517 993 1430 870 1459 940 1632 1055 0.654581 0.608392 0.644277 0.646446 53 -185
3 1517 950 1430 920 1459 909 1632 1033 0.626236 0.643357 0.623029 0.632966 41 -113
4 1517 922 1430 894 1459 947 1632 1063 0.607779 0.625175 0.649075 0.651348 -25 -169
5 1517 945 1430 897 1459 894 1632 1069 0.62294 0.627273 0.612748 0.655025 51 -172
6 1517 921 1430 916 1459 931 1632 1060 0.607119 0.640559 0.638108 0.64951 -10 -144
7 1517 998 1430 892 1459 945 1632 1026 0.657877 0.623776 0.647704 0.628676 53 -134
8 1517 965 1430 883 1459 930 1632 1073 0.636124 0.617483 0.637423 0.657475 35 -190
9 1517 960 1430 900 1459 926 1632 1031 0.632828 0.629371 0.634681 0.63174 34 -131
10 1517 947 1430 900 1459 919 1632 1042 0.624258 0.629371 0.629883 0.63848 28 -142
11 1517 965 1430 921 1459 941 1632 1062 0.636124 0.644056 0.644962 0.650735 24 -141
12 1517 965 1430 901 1459 915 1632 1062 0.636124 0.63007 0.627142 0.650735 50 -161
13 1517 973 1430 902 1459 933 1632 1022 0.641397 0.630769 0.639479 0.626225 40 -120
14 1517 946 1430 885 1459 929 1632 1021 0.623599 0.618881 0.636737 0.625613 17 -136
15 1517 981 1430 876 1459 927 1632 1037 0.646671 0.612587 0.635367 0.635417 54 -161
Average 1517 958.2667 1430 896.6 1459 928.9333 1632 1048 0.631685 0.626993 0.636692 0.642157 32.5 -146




(a) Results for TDDS: MCU and Radio 
  
(b) Results for TDDS_AES_SHA1: MCU and Radio 
  
(c) Results for TDDS_AES_MMH: MCU and Radio 
Figure 42: Energy consumption results for all MW versions with different data rates. 
Figure 43 provides a comparison of PDR value for different data rates and different 
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middleware at an average data rate equal to 4 msg/s. We can notice that PDR for all version 
is almost perfect when the number of the publishers is less than or equal to 4. The 
configuration of the channels and radio parameters for the simulator are set up so that 
without interference from neighbors, the probability of dropped message is very small. 
However, when the number of publishers is eight or higher, the effect of congestion of the 
messages starts to take effect on the base-station and in the routing path relay nodes to the 
base-station. The message drop is at the highest point in the case of 24 publishers. Also, 
we can notice that TDDS_AES_MMH performs better than TDDS_AES_SHA1. Figure 
43 part(b) compares the results obtained from changing the data rate in average from 0.25 
msg/s to 8 msg/s for all cases for the same version of the middleware TDDS_AES_SHA1. 
It is clear from the figure that the PDR is almost perfect for slow data rates less than 2 
msg/s on average.  The PDR value decreases when the data rate increases and the packet 
loss is very high when the data rate reaches 8 msg/s. 
  
(a) Different MW versions at the data rate 4 msg/s (b) TDDS_AES_SHA1 at different data rates 
Figure 43: Packet delivery ratio comparisons. 
 
Figure 44 provides a comparison of EED value when the data rate is 4 msg/s. Figure 44 
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middleware, and the other two secured implementations. We can see that the delay 
decreases as the number of Publishers increases from 1 to 16. The location of the Publisher 
affects the delay. The farther the distance of the Publisher from the Subscriber the longer 
the time packets need to arrive. In the first case, the Publisher is at the far end in the network 
from the Subscriber. In the second case, with the two Publishers, including the same 
publisher from the first case, we can notice that the value EED is close to the first case. 
The reason why, the number of hops for the messages to reach the subscriber node is the 
same in both cases, as discussed in the routing detail for the network. In the case of 24 
Publishers, which is full load traffic, the delay roughly the same as the previous case. For 
the last case, eight new publishers are added to the previous case and distributed in 
symmetrical locations far from the subscriber node. We made individual calculations of 
each node, in the network, and found that the total average EED time of the new publishers 
does not contribute to reducing the overall EDD of the network. In the other cases, when 
we move from case to case, we double the number of the publishers each time, this way, 
the contribution on the overall EDD will be noticeable. Also, we can notice that the secured 
versions follow the same trend of basic TDDS version, but in all cases, it takes longer time 
due to extra computations for security components. Furthermore, Figure 44 part(b) shows 
the values of EDD for different data rates. The values are nearly the same in all cases, but 
for faster rates, there is more drop-in packets especially from the far nodes from the 
subscriber. We noticed after analyzing the individual nodes values that there are more 
messages successfully arrived closer to the subscriber than the farther nodes, which 
contributes on reducing the overall network EED value on faster data rates. This case can 
be noticed for the cases of 16 publishers and 24 publishers. In the ideal case, where we do 
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not have drop packets in each case or equally expected drops, the value of EED does not 
change with the change in data rate. 
  
(a) Different MW versions at the data rate 4 msg/s (b) TDDS_AES_SHA1 at different data rates 
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2 msg/s 4 msg/s 8 msg/s
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7 CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK   
7.1 Conclusion 
WSN is an important platform that offers a variety of applications that can be used with 
significant interests in both academia and industry. However, developing applications for 
WSNs is a complex process, especially when interacting with the sensor’s hardware 
components, and dealing with the constraints of WSNs regarding memory requirements, 
the computation power, and energy resources. Therefore, there is a need for an intermediate 
layer to facilitate the process of focusing on developing the sensor applications without 
worrying about the underlying hardware components, where the importance of supporting 
a middleware is emerged. In this work, a light-weight middleware called TinyDDS is 
considered for improvements in the aspect of security measures. It is investigated using 
simulation experiments to evaluate the performance when adding information security 
components. The middleware has ported the DDS features and functionalities into WSN, 
which includes many categories of QoS policies easy to use. The publish/subscribe 
communication model in DDS is well suited for large-scale distributed computing systems. 
That is because of the decoupling properties for the network’s participants in time, space, 
and synchronization. DDS is a standard for supporting real-time distributed systems based 
on the publish/subscribe scheme. 
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The security enhancements in the middleware aim to provide data confidentiality, integrity, 
and message authentication. Several cryptographic algorithms are surveyed to select 
suitable algorithms to be implemented in our modified version of TinyDDS to account for 
the resource constraints in sensor nodes. Our security module is transparent to the 
middleware, that is there are no modifications to the original application or the 
communication protocol. The results regarding performance evaluation for energy 
consumption, memory occupancy and time delay, show a reasonable overhead in 
comparison with the basic middleware. We explained further results to reduce the overhead 
when implementing the integrity functionality.  
 
7.2 Future work directions 
As a future direction work, we can investigate other cryptographic algorithms and the 
trade-offs in their security and their impact on the WSN performance.  
For the results, we have focused on having one subscriber in the network, which is also 
acting as the base-station. Furthermore, the number of topics for the data is set to one topic. 
Considering more topics in the network will give us a chance of having a node to act as 
publisher and subscriber at the same time. It can be a publisher for a topic and a subscriber 
for another topic.  
The topology of the network in our experiments is a square grid topology. The reason for 
selecting it is to reduce the simulation time. Other topology options can be considered, such 
as random topology, where the nodes are distributed randomly within physical terrain 
boundaries. There is also a cluster topology which is a mix between the grid and the random 
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topology. In such topology, the physical terrain is divided into some clusters, and the node 
is placed randomly in each cluster. Also, the developer can define a customized topology 
scenario.  
 Another possible direction is to consider the distribution of the base-station functionality 
over several nodes in the cluster topology especially when the size of the network is 
significantly large. The cluster head nodes will serve as the cluster base-station and will be 
responsible for granting access to the nodes within the cluster. 
Yet another potential direction is to consider the use of public-key group Elliptic Curve 
Diffie-Hellman [95] to achieve mutual authentication and establish a shared symmetric key 






[1] I. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, "Wireless Sensor 
Networks: A Survey. Comput-er Networks, 38, 393-422," ed, 2002. 
[2] M. Petrovic, V. Muthusamy, and H.-A. Jacobsen, "Managing Automation Data 
Flows in Sensor/Actuator Networks," 2007. 
[3] T. R. Sheltami, A. A. Al-Roubaiey, and A. S. H. Mahmoud, "A survey on 
developing publish/subscribe middleware over wireless sensor/actuator 
networks," Wireless Networks, pp. 1-22. 
[4] J. P. Walters, Z. Liang, W. Shi, and V. Chaudhary, "Wireless sensor network 
security: A survey," Security in distributed, grid, mobile, and pervasive 
computing, vol. 1, p. 367, 2007. 
[5] A.-H. Jallad and T. Vladimirova, "Data-centricity in wireless sensor networks," in 
Guide to Wireless Sensor Networks, ed: Springer, 2009, pp. 183-204. 
[6] B. Krishnamachari, D. Estrin, and S. Wicker, "Modelling data-centric routing in 
wireless sensor networks," in IEEE infocom, 2002, pp. 39-44. 
[7] D. A. Tran and L. H. Truong, "Enabling publish/subscribe services in sensor 
networks," University of Massachusetts, Boston and IBM Zurich Research 
Laboratory, Switzerland, 2010. 
[8] P. Boonma and J. Suzuki, "Middleware support for pluggable non-functional 
properties in wireless sensor networks," in Services-Part I, 2008. IEEE Congress 
on, 2008, pp. 360-367. 
[9] C. Esposito, D. Cotroneo, and S. Russo, "On reliability in publish/subscribe 
services," Computer Networks, vol. 57, pp. 1318-1343, 2013. 
[10] M.-M. Wang, J.-N. Cao, J. Li, and S. K. Dasi, "Middleware for wireless sensor 
networks: A survey," Journal of computer science and technology, vol. 23, pp. 
305-326, 2008. 
[11] W. B. Heinzelman, A. L. Murphy, H. S. Carvalho, and M. Perillo, "Middleware to 
support sensor network applications," Network, IEEE, vol. 18, pp. 6-14, 2004. 
[12] S. Hadim and N. Mohamed, "Middleware: Middleware challenges and 
approaches for wireless sensor networks," IEEE distributed systems online, p. 1, 
2006. 
[13] N. Mohamed and J. Al-Jaroodi, "A survey on service-oriented middleware for 
wireless sensor networks," Service Oriented Computing and Applications, vol. 5, 
pp. 71-85, 2011. 
[14] B. Bhuyan, H. K. D. Sarma, and N. Sarma, "A Survey on Middleware for 
Wireless Sensor Networks," Journal of Wireless Networking and 
Communications, vol. 4, pp. 7-17, 2014. 
[15] C.-C. Shen, C. Srisathapornphat, and C. Jaikaeo, "Sensor information networking 
architecture and applications," Personal communications, IEEE, vol. 8, pp. 52-59, 
2001. 
[16] P. Bonnet, J. Gehrke, and P. Seshadri, "Towards sensor database systems," in 
Mobile Data Management, 2001, pp. 3-14. 
133 
 
[17] S. Li, S. H. Son, and J. A. Stankovic, "Event detection services using data service 
middleware in distributed sensor networks," in Information Processing in Sensor 
Networks, 2003, pp. 502-517. 
[18] S. R. Madden, M. J. Franklin, J. M. Hellerstein, and W. Hong, "TinyDB: an 
acquisitional query processing system for sensor networks," ACM Transactions 
on database systems (TODS), vol. 30, pp. 122-173, 2005. 
[19] E. Souto, G. Guimarães, G. Vasconcelos, M. Vieira, N. Rosa, and C. Ferraz, "A 
message-oriented middleware for sensor networks," in Proceedings of the 2nd 
workshop on Middleware for pervasive and ad-hoc computing, 2004, pp. 127-
134. 
[20] P. J. Marrón, A. Lachenmann, D. Minder, J. Hahner, R. Sauter, and K. Rothermel, 
"TinyCubus: a flexible and adaptive framework sensor networks," in Wireless 
Sensor Networks, 2005. Proceeedings of the Second European Workshop on, 
2005, pp. 278-289. 
[21] P. Costa, G. Coulson, C. Mascolo, L. Mottola, G. P. Picco, and S. Zachariadis, 
"Reconfigurable component-based middleware for networked embedded 
systems," International Journal of Wireless Information Networks, vol. 14, pp. 
149-162, 2007. 
[22] Q. Han and N. Venkatasubramanian, "Autosec: An integrated middleware 
framework for dynamic service brokering," IEEE Distributed Systems Online, 
vol. 2, pp. 22-31, 2001. 
[23] T. Liu and M. Martonosi, "Impala: A middleware system for managing 
autonomic, parallel sensor systems," in ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 2003, pp. 107-
118. 
[24] P. Levis and D. Culler, "Maté: A tiny virtual machine for sensor networks," in 
ACM Sigplan Notices, 2002, pp. 85-95. 
[25] R. Barr, J. C. Bicket, D. S. Dantas, B. Du, T. Kim, B. Zhou, et al., "On the need 
for system-level support for ad hoc and sensor networks," ACM SIGOPS 
Operating Systems Review, vol. 36, pp. 1-5, 2002. 
[26] C.-L. Fok, G.-C. Roman, and C. Lu, "Mobile agent middleware for sensor 
networks: An application case study," in Information Processing in Sensor 
Networks, 2005. IPSN 2005. Fourth International Symposium on, 2005, pp. 382-
387. 
[27] P. Costa, L. Mottola, A. L. Murphy, and G. P. Picco, "Programming wireless 
sensor networks with the TeenyLime middleware," in Middleware 2007, ed: 
Springer, 2007, pp. 429-449. 
[28] C. Curino, M. Giani, M. Giorgetta, A. Giusti, A. L. Murphy, and G. P. Picco, 
"Tinylime: Bridging mobile and sensor networks through middleware," in 
Pervasive Computing and Communications, 2005. PerCom 2005. Third IEEE 
International Conference on, 2005, pp. 61-72. 
[29] R. de Cassia Acioli Lima, N. S. Rosa, and I. R. L. Marques, "TS-Mid: 
Middleware for Wireless Sensor Networks Based on Tuple Space," in Advanced 
Information Networking and Applications-Workshops, 2008. AINAW 2008. 22nd 
International Conference on, 2008, pp. 886-891. 
[30] G. Banavar, T. Chandra, R. Strom, and D. Sturman, "A case for message oriented 
middleware," in Distributed Computing, ed: Springer, 1999, pp. 1-17. 
134 
 
[31] P. T. Eugster, P. A. Felber, R. Guerraoui, and A.-M. Kermarrec, "The many faces 
of publish/subscribe," ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 35, pp. 114-131, 
2003. 
[32] P. Levis, S. Madden, J. Polastre, R. Szewczyk, K. Whitehouse, A. Woo, et al., 
"TinyOS: An operating system for sensor networks," Ambient intelligence, vol. 
35, 2004. 
[33] S. L. Keoh, N. Dulay, E. Lupu, K. Twidle, A. E. Schaeffer-Filho, M. Sloman, et 
al., "Self-managed cell: A middleware for managing body-sensor networks," in 
Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking & Services, 2007. MobiQuitous 
2007. Fourth Annual International Conference on, 2007, pp. 1-5. 
[34] L. H. Freitas, K. Bispo, N. S. Rosa, and P. R. Cunha, "SM-Sens: security 
middleware for wireless sensor networks," in Information Infrastructure 
Symposium, 2009. GIIS'09. Global, 2009, pp. 1-7. 
[35] R. Daidone, G. Dini, and M. Tiloca, "STaR: a Reconfigurable and Transparent 
middleware for WSNs security," in CONET/UBICITEC, 2013, pp. 73-88. 
[36] P. Chapin and C. Skalka, "SpartanRPC: Secure WSN middleware for cooperating 
domains," in Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems (MASS), 2010 IEEE 7th 
International Conference on, 2010, pp. 61-70. 
[37] D. Gay, P. Levis, R. Von Behren, M. Welsh, E. Brewer, and D. Culler, "The nesC 
language: A holistic approach to networked embedded systems," in Acm Sigplan 
Notices, 2003, pp. 1-11. 
[38] C. Vairo, M. Albano, and S. Chessa, "A secure middleware for wireless sensor 
networks," in Proceedings of the 5th Annual International Conference on Mobile 
and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing, Networking, and Services, 2008, p. 59. 
[39] S. Marchesani, L. Pomante, M. Pugliese, and F. Santucci, "A Middleware 
Approach to Provide Security in IEEE 802.15. 4 Wireless Sensor Networks," in 
MOBILe Wireless MiddleWARE, Operating Systems and Applications 
(Mobilware), 2013 International Conference on, 2013, pp. 85-93. 
[40] M. Valero, S. S. Jung, Y. Li, and R. Beyah, Di-sec: A distributed security 
framework for heterogeneous wireless sensor networks: IEEE, 2012. 
[41] N. Matthys, C. Huygens, D. Hughes, S. Michiels, and W. Joosen, "A component 
and policy-based approach for efficient sensor network reconfiguration," in 
Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY), 2012 IEEE 
International Symposium on, 2012, pp. 53-60. 
[42] G. Russello, L. Mostarda, and N. Dulay, "A policy-based publish/subscribe 
middleware for sense-and-react applications," Journal of Systems and Software, 
vol. 84, pp. 638-654, 2011. 
[43] G. Dini and I. M. Savino, "A security architecture for reconfigurable networked 
embedded systems," International Journal of Wireless Information Networks, vol. 
17, pp. 11-25, 2010. 
[44] M. Datasheet, "Crossbow technology inc," San Jose, California, 2006. 
[45] H. Krawczyk, R. Canetti, and M. Bellare, "HMAC: Keyed-hashing for message 
authentication," 1997. 
[46] S. Blake-Wilson, D. Brown, and P. Lambert, "Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS),"  2070-1721, 2002. 
135 
 
[47] R. L. Rivest, "The RC5 encryption algorithm," in Fast Software Encryption, 
1994, pp. 86-96. 
[48] Moteiv Corporation: Ultra low power IEEE 802.15.4 compliant wireless sensor 
module. Available: http://www.snm.ethz.ch/snmwiki/pub/uploads/Projects/tmote-
sky-datasheet.pdf 
[49] Texas Instruments: Texas instruments cc2420 2.4 ghz ieee 802.15.4 / zigbee ready 
rf transceiver Available: http://focus.ti.com/lit/ds/symlink/cc2420.pdf 
[50] U.S. National Security Agency (NSA): SKIPJACK and KEA algorithm 
specifications (May 1998). Available: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/skipjack/skipjack.pdf 
[51] D. Eastlake and P. Jones, "US secure hash algorithm 1 (SHA1)," ed: RFC 3174, 
September, 2001. 
[52] V. Rijmen and J. Daemen, "Advanced encryption standard," Proceedings of 
Federal Information Processing Standards Publications, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, pp. 19-22, 2001. 
[53] P. Chapin. “Sprocket home page,”. Available: 
http://www.cs.uvm.edu/%7Epchapin/Sprocket/ 
[54] A. Dunkels, B. Grönvall, and T. Voigt, "Contiki-a lightweight and flexible 
operating system for tiny networked sensors," in Local Computer Networks, 2004. 
29th Annual IEEE International Conference on, 2004, pp. 455-462. 
[55] AVR RZ Raven Datesheet Available: http://www.atmel.com/Images/doc8117.pdf 
[56] D. Wheeler and R. Needham, "TEA extensions (October 1997), Also Correction 
to XTEA (October 1998)," Available via: www. ftp. cl. cam. ac. uk/ftp/users/djw3. 
[57] P. Levis, N. Lee, M. Welsh, and D. Culler, "TOSSIM: Accurate and scalable 
simulation of entire TinyOS applications," in Proceedings of the 1st international 
conference on Embedded networked sensor systems, 2003, pp. 126-137. 
[58] G. Bertoni, L. Breveglieri, and M. Venturi, "Power aware design of an elliptic 
curve coprocessor for 8 bit platforms," in Pervasive Computing and 
Communications Workshops, 2006. PerCom Workshops 2006. Fourth Annual 
IEEE International Conference on, 2006, pp. 5 pp.-341. 
[59] D. J. Malan, M. Welsh, and M. D. Smith, "A public-key infrastructure for key 
distribution in TinyOS based on elliptic curve cryptography," in Sensor and Ad 
Hoc Communications and Networks, 2004. IEEE SECON 2004. 2004 First 
Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on, 2004, pp. 71-80. 
[60] K. Piotrowski, P. Langendoerfer, and S. Peter, "How public key cryptography 
influences wireless sensor node lifetime," in Proceedings of the fourth ACM 
workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks, 2006, pp. 169-176. 
[61] A. S. Wander, N. Gura, H. Eberle, V. Gupta, and S. C. Shantz, "Energy analysis 
of public-key cryptography for wireless sensor networks," in Pervasive 
Computing and Communications, 2005. PerCom 2005. Third IEEE International 
Conference on, 2005, pp. 324-328. 
[62] D. Jinwala, D. Patel, and K. Dasgupta, "Optimizing the block cipher and modes of 
operations overhead at the link layer security framework in the wireless sensor 




[63] Y. W. Law, J. Doumen, and P. Hartel, "Survey and benchmark of block ciphers 
for wireless sensor networks," ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN), 
vol. 2, pp. 65-93, 2006. 
[64] J. Lee, K. Kapitanova, and S. H. Son, "The price of security in wireless sensor 
networks," Computer Networks, vol. 54, pp. 2967-2978, 2010. 
[65] A. Trad, A. A. Bahattab, and S. B. Othman, "Performance trade-offs of 
encryption algorithms for Wireless Sensor Networks," in Computer Applications 
and Information Systems (WCCAIS), 2014 World Congress on, 2014, pp. 1-6. 
[66] M. Çakırolu, C. Bayilmi, T. Özcerit, and Ö. Çetin, "Performance evaluation of 
scalable encryption algorithm for WSNs," J. Sci. Res. Essays, vol. 5, pp. 856-861, 
2010. 
[67] K. Biswas, V. Muthukkumarasamy, X.-W. Wu, and K. Singh, "Performance 
evaluation of block ciphers for wireless sensor networks," in Advanced 
Computing and Communication Technologies, ed: Springer, 2016, pp. 443-452. 
[68] W. K. Koo, H. Lee, Y. H. Kim, and D. H. Lee, "Implementation and analysis of 
new lightweight cryptographic algorithm suitable for wireless sensor networks," 
in Information Security and Assurance, 2008. ISA 2008. International Conference 
on, 2008, pp. 73-76. 
[69] K. Biswas, V. Muthukkumarasamy, E. Sithirasenan, and K. Singh, "A simple 
lightweight encryption scheme for wireless sensor networks," in International 
Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking, 2014, pp. 499-504. 
[70] K. Biswas, "Lightweight Security Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks," in A 
World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM), 2014 IEEE 
15th International Symposium on, 2014, pp. 1-2. 
[71] M. Cazorla, K. Marquet, and M. Minier, "Survey and benchmark of lightweight 
block ciphers for wireless sensor networks," in Security and Cryptography 
(SECRYPT), 2013 International Conference on, 2013, pp. 1-6. 
[72] M. Cazorla, S. Gourgeon, K. Marquet, and M. Minier, "Survey and benchmark of 
lightweight block ciphers for MSP430 16‐bit microcontroller," Security and 
Communication Networks, vol. 8, pp. 3564-3579, 2015. 
[73] C. Karlof, N. Sastry, and D. Wagner, "TinySec: a link layer security architecture 
for wireless sensor networks," in Proceedings of the 2nd international conference 
on Embedded networked sensor systems, 2004, pp. 162-175. 
[74] N. FIPS, "198: The keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC)," National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal Information Processing 
Standards, p. 29, 2002. 
[75] J. Black, S. Halevi, H. Krawczyk, T. Krovetz, and P. Rogaway, "UMAC: Fast and 
secure message authentication," in Annual International Cryptology Conference, 
1999, pp. 216-233. 
[76] T. Krovetz, "Message authentication on 64-bit architectures," in Selected Areas in 
Cryptography, 2006, pp. 327-341. 
[77] S. Halevi and H. Krawczyk, "MMH: Software message authentication in the 
Gbit/second rates," in International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, 
1997, pp. 172-189. 
[78] A. A. Al-Roubaiey, "Energy-aware publish/subscribe DDS-based middleware for 
wireless senesor and actuator networks," KFUPM, 2015. 
137 
 
[79] E. Perla, A. Ó. Catháin, R. S. Carbajo, M. Huggard, and C. Mc Goldrick, 
"PowerTOSSIM z: realistic energy modelling for wireless sensor network 
environments," in Proceedings of the 3nd ACM workshop on Performance 
monitoring and measurement of heterogeneous wireless and wired networks, 
2008, pp. 35-42. 
[80] E. Yarrkov, "Cryptanalysis of XXTEA," IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 
2010, p. 254, 2010. 
[81] A. Bogdanov, L. R. Knudsen, G. Leander, C. Paar, A. Poschmann, M. J. 
Robshaw, et al., "PRESENT: An ultra-lightweight block cipher," in International 
Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2007, pp. 450-
466. 
[82] J. Borghoff, A. Canteaut, T. Güneysu, E. B. Kavun, M. Knezevic, L. R. Knudsen, 
et al., "PRINCE–a low-latency block cipher for pervasive computing 
applications," in International Conference on the Theory and Application of 
Cryptology and Information Security, 2012, pp. 208-225. 
[83] R. Beaulieu, D. Shors, J. Smith, S. Treatman-Clark, B. Weeks, and L. Wingers, 
"The SIMON and SPECK block ciphers on AVR 8-bit microcontrollers," in 
International Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy, 
2014, pp. 3-20. 
[84] B. C. Neuman and T. Ts'o, "Kerberos: An authentication service for computer 
networks," IEEE Communications magazine, vol. 32, pp. 33-38, 1994. 
[85] P. Syverson, "A taxonomy of replay attacks [cryptographic protocols]," in 
Computer Security Foundations Workshop VII, 1994. CSFW 7. Proceedings, 
1994, pp. 187-191. 
[86] A. A. Al-Roubaiey, T. R. Sheltami, and A. S. H. Mahmoud, "Id-based routing 
protocol for wireless network with a grid topology," ed: Google Patents, 2017. 
[87] W. Xu, W. Trappe, Y. Zhang, and T. Wood, "The feasibility of launching and 
detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks," in Proceedings of the 6th ACM 
international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing, 2005, pp. 
46-57. 
[88] D. R. Raymond, R. C. Marchany, M. I. Brownfield, and S. F. Midkiff, "Effects of 
denial-of-sleep attacks on wireless sensor network MAC protocols," IEEE 
transactions on vehicular technology, vol. 58, pp. 367-380, 2009. 
[89] C. Karlof and D. Wagner, "Secure routing in wireless sensor networks: Attacks 
and countermeasures," Ad hoc networks, vol. 1, pp. 293-315, 2003. 
[90] J. Deng, R. Han, and S. Mishra, "Defending against path-based DoS attacks in 
wireless sensor networks," in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security 
of ad hoc and sensor networks, 2005, pp. 89-96. 
[91] J. Zhao and R. Govindan, "Understanding packet delivery performance in dense 
wireless sensor networks," in Proceedings of the 1st international conference on 
Embedded networked sensor systems, 2003, pp. 1-13. 
[92] B. Scheers, W. Mees, and B. Lauwens, "Developments on an IEEE 802.15. 4-
based wireless sensor network," Journal of telecommunications and information 
technology, pp. 46-53, 2008. 
138 
 
[93] T. Sun, L.-J. Chen, C.-C. Han, G. Yang, and M. Gerla, "Measuring effective 
capacity of IEEE 802.15. 4 beaconless mode," in Wireless Communications and 
Networking Conference, 2006. WCNC 2006. IEEE, 2006, pp. 493-498. 
[94] A. A. Al-Roubaiey, "Energy-Aware Publish/Subscribe DDS-Based Middleware 
for Wireless Sensor and Actuator Networks," King Fahd University of Petroleum 
and Minerals (Saudi Arabia), 2015. 
[95] Y. Wang, B. Ramamurthy, and X. Zou, "The performance of elliptic curve based 
group diffie-hellman protocols for secure group communication over ad hoc 
networks," in Communications, 2006. ICC'06. IEEE International Conference on, 








Name    :ABDALLAH HASAN KHALIL RASHED 
Nationality   :Jordanian 
Date of Birth   9/9/1984 
 Email    :abd_rashed2000@yahoo.com 
Address   :Beit Leed, Tulkarm, Palestine 
Academic Background   
Ph.D (Computer Science and Engineering)  
   May 2018 
     King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals   
      Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 
M.S (Computer Engineering)  
   December 2012  
     King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals   
      Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.  
   B.S (Computer Engineering) 
    June 2008 
   An-Najah National University 
Nablus, Palestine. 
 
